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This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the ques-
tion of robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that
dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness
principlethatextendstheone-shotdeviationprinciple. Usingthisresult,wecom-
pute explicitly the set of dynamically robust equilibrium values in the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma. We show that robustness requirements have sharp intuitive
implications regarding when cooperation can be sustained, what strategies are
best suited to sustain cooperation, and how changes in payoffs affect the sustain-
ability of cooperation. We also show that a folk theorem in dynamically robust
equilibria holds, but requires stronger identiﬁability conditions than the pairwise
full rank condition of Fudenberg et al. (1994).
Keywords. Robustness to incomplete information, one-shot robustness princi-
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1. Introduction
This paper formalizes and explores a notion of robustness to incomplete information in
repeated games. We characterize dynamically robust equilibria by applying a one-shot
robustness principle that extends the one-shot deviation principle. As a corollary, we
prove a factorization result analogous to that of Abreu et al. (1990). An important im-
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most recent offender rather than all players—are more robust than grim-trigger strate-
gies. Concerns of robustness can also change comparative statics. For instance, di-
minishing payoffs obtained off of the equilibrium path can make cooperation harder to
sustain.
Our notion of robustness to incomplete information extends the framework of Kajii
and Morris (1997; henceforth KM) to repeated games. Informally, an equilibrium of a
repeated game is robust to incomplete information if every perturbed game where pay-
offs are affected by “small” independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) incomplete-
information shocks admits a “nearby” equilibrium. Sections 3 and 4 formalize this de-
ﬁnition by specifying what it means for payoff perturbations to be small and for strate-
gies to be nearby. Following KM, we interpret robust equilibria as those equilibria that
remain reasonable predictions even if the underlying environment is misspeciﬁed.
Our main theoretical results make analysis tractable by relating the dynamic robust-
ness of equilibria in repeated games to the robustness of one-shot action proﬁles in ap-
propriate families of static games. In particular, we prove a one-shot robustness princi-
ple analogous to the one-shot deviation principle. More precisely, an equilibrium of a
repeated game is dynamically robust if and only if, at any history, the prescribed action
proﬁle is robust in the stage game augmented with continuation values. In the case of
two-by-two stage games, this amounts to requiring that, at any history, the prescribed
equilibrium outcome is risk-dominant in the appropriate augmented stage game.1 Fur-
thermore, this one-shot robustness principle implies a factorization result à la Abreu
et al. (1990; henceforth APS). Speciﬁcally, equilibrium values sustained by dynamically
robust equilibria essentially correspond to the largest ﬁxed point of a robust value map-
ping that associates future continuation values with current values generated by robust
equilibria of corresponding augmented stage games.
Three applications highlight the practical value of these characterizations. First, we
study the effect of speciﬁc perturbations in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We be-
gin with a motivating example in which a player is sometimes irresistibly tempted to
defect. We show that whether grim-trigger strategies are robust to such perturbations
depends both on the gains from unilateral defection and on the cost of cooperating
against a defector.2 An implication of this result is that robustness concerns can have
signiﬁcant effects on comparative statics of interest. Using the example of two ﬁrms in
a joint venture, we show that making the ﬁrms more interdependent (for instance, by
leaving unspeciﬁed the ultimate allocation of jointly owned assets in case the venture
ends) can facilitate cooperation under complete information and reduce cooperation
once robustness concerns are taken care of.
1Thusouranalysisprovidesatheoreticalfoundationfortheuseoftherisk-dominancecriterioninthere-
peated prisoners’ dilemma discussed by Blonski and Spagnolo (2004) and tested in laboratory experiments
by DalBoandFrechette(forthcoming). Notethatourrobustnessexercisecanapplytoenvironmentswhere
there is no uncertainty about material payoffs (e.g., in laboratory experiments) if one allows for uncertainty
about psychological payoffs.
2Note that this occurs even though the probability of outcome (Defect Cooperate) is vanishingly small
in the equilibrium.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 51
Second, for any discount factor, we compute explicitly the set of dynamically robust
equilibrium values in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We show that, whenever out-
come (Defect Cooperate) can be enforced under complete information, the set of dy-
namically robust equilibrium values is essentially equal to the set of equilibrium values
under complete information. Inversely, whenever (Defect Cooperate) is not enforce-
able under complete information, the set of dynamically robust equilibria shrinks to
permanent defection. In addition, we highlight that grim-trigger strategies are not best
suited to sustain robust cooperation and show that selective-punishment strategies—
that punish only deviators upon unilateral deviations—are robust over a larger set of
parameter values.
Finally, we show that a folk theorem in dynamically robust equilibria holds for re-
peated games with imperfect public monitoring, but that it requires stronger identi-
ﬁability conditions than the pairwise full rank condition of Fudenberg et al. (1994)t o
control continuation values upon both unilateral and joint deviations from equilibrium
behavior. As a corollary, this folk theorem provides an existence result for dynamically
robust equilibria for discount factors close to 1. This is useful given that the existence of
robustequilibriaisnotguaranteedingeneralstaticgames(see,forinstance,Example3.1
in KM).
Our approach to robustness is closely related to that of KM and has a similar inter-
pretation. SincethepioneeringworkofRubinstein(1989)andC arlssonandvanDamme
(1993), who show that strict equilibria of two-by-two games can be destabilized by ar-
bitrarily small perturbations, the question of robustness to incomplete information has
received much attention. Work on this topic is of two kinds. A variety of applied work
uses robustness to incomplete information as a criterion for equilibrium selection.3
A complementary literature explores robustness to incomplete information to ensure
that speciﬁc equilibria of interest are robust to reasonable perturbations in the informa-
tion structure.4 K M ,a sw e l la st h i sp a p e r ,p r o v i d eab e n c h m a r kf o rb o t ht y p e so fs t u d i e s
by analyzing the robustness of equilibria to all small perturbations in the information
structure.5 By considering a large class of possible perturbations, rather than focusing
onspeciﬁcones,thisapproachprovidesgeneralsufﬁcientconditionsthatguaranteethe
robustness of equilibria, and establishes informative bounds on how much selection
can be achieved using perturbations in the information structure.6
This paper contributes to the literature on repeated games by highlighting how ro-
bustness concerns affect the efﬁcient provision of dynamic incentives. In this sense, our
3See, for instance, Morris and Shin (1998), Chamley (1999), Frankel et al. (2003), Goldstein and Pauzner
(2004), or Argenziano (2008). See Morris and Shin (2003) for an extensive literature review.
4See, for instance, Bergemann and Morris (2005), Oury and Tercieux (2009), or Aghion et al. (2010).
5KM as well as Monderer and Samet (1989) or this paper consider perturbations that are small from
an ex ante perspective. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) consider perturbations that are close from an interim
perspective in the product topology on the universal type space. See Dekel et al. (2006), Chen et al. (2010),
or Ely and P˛ eski (2006) for recent work exploring in details various topologies on informational types. Note
alsothatKMmaintainthecommon-prior assumption. OyamaandTercieux(2010)andIzmalkov andYildiz
(2010) consider incomplete-information perturbations that do not satisfy the common-prior assumption.
We relax the common-prior assumption in Appendix A.
6These bounds are tight in the context of repeated two-by-two games since it can be shown that global-
game perturbations are, in fact, most destabilizing.52 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
paper extends the work of Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd (2007)o rChassang (2010), who
analyze dynamic global games in which the question of efﬁcient punishment schemes
does not arise. Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd (2007) show that, in a ﬁnite-horizon game
with strategic complementarities, a global-game perturbation à la Carlsson and van
Damme (1993) selects a unique equilibrium. Chassang (2010) considers an inﬁnite-
horizon exit game and shows that, even though the global-game perturbation does not
yield uniqueness, it still selects a subset of equilibria whose qualitative properties are
driven by risk-dominance considerations. An important difference between these pa-
pers and ours is that they consider robustness to a speciﬁc information perturbation
whereas we study robustness to all sequences of independent elaborations. This makes
our robustness results stronger and our nonrobustness results weaker. From a techni-
cal perspective, considering robustness to all small perturbations simpliﬁes the analysis
and, in particular, allows us to dispense with strategic complementarity, which is fre-
quently assumed in the global-games literature (see, for instance, Frankel et al. (2003)).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating example. Sec-
tion 3 deﬁnes robustness in static games. Section 4 formalizes our notion of dynamic
robustnessforrepeatedgamesandprovidesthemaincharacterizationresults. Section 5
applies the results of Section 4 to study how concerns of robustness change analysis in
the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Section 6 proves a folk theorem in dynamically robust
equilibria for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Section 7 concludes.
AppendixAextendsouranalysistoallowforincomplete-informationperturbationsthat
do not satisfy the common-prior assumption, as well as persistent payoff shocks. Proofs
and technical extensions are contained in Appendices B and C.
2. A motivating example
This section illustrates how considering incomplete-information perturbations can en-
richtheanalysisofsimplerepeatedgamesinrealisticways. Wealsoemphasizethevalue
of a systematic approach to robustness.
2.1 The repeated prisoners’ dilemma
Throughout this section, let PD denote the two-player prisoners’ dilemma with actions
A1 = A2 ={ C D} and payoffs
CD
C 1 1 −c b
D b −c 0 0
where b>1, c>0,a n db − c<2.L e t A = A1 × A2. We denote by  PD the inﬁnitely
repeated version of PD with discount factor δ ∈ (0 1).L e tHt = At denote histories of
length t. We allow players to condition their behavior on a public randomization device
but omit it from histories for conciseness.
The analysis of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma is greatly simpliﬁed by the penal
code approach of Abreu (1988). Without loss of efﬁciency, to enforce cooperation itTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 53
is sufﬁcient to consider grim-trigger strategies such that players play C if D has never
been played (cooperative state), and players play D if D has been played in some past
period (punishment state). Conditional on the other player cooperating, grim-trigger
strategies provide players with the highest incentives to cooperate as well. Under com-
plete information, grim-trigger strategies form a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if
and only if δ/(1 − δ) ≥ b − 1. In words, cooperation is sustainable whenever the value
of future cooperation is greater than the short term gains from deviation. Note that the
cost c of cooperating while one’s partner is defecting does not affect the sustainability of
cooperation.
Throughout the paper we examine the robustness of these insights with respect
to small misspeciﬁcations in the structure of the game of the kind considered by
Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme (1993), or Morris and Shin (1998). Does
cost c start playing a more signiﬁcant role in determining the sustainability of coopera-
tion? Do grim-trigger strategies remain an optimal way to sustain cooperation?
2.2 An incomplete-information perturbation
Consider, for instance, the following perturbation of  PD.I ne v e r yp e r i o dt, payoffs de-
pend on an i.i.d. state ωt uniformly distributed over {1 2     L} with integer L ≥ 1.I f
ωt ∈{ 1 2     L− 1}, then players are in a normal state with payoffs given by PD. If
ωt = L, then player 1 is “tempted” to play D with payoffs given by
CD
C 1 1 −c b
D B −cB   0
where B>b / ( 1 − δ) so that D is a dominant action for player 1 in the temptation state.
We assume that player 1 is informed and observes a signal x1 t = ωt, while player 2 ob-
serves only a noisy signal x2 t = ωt − ξt,w h e r eξt is an even coin ﬂip over {0 1}.W ed e -
note by  L
PD this perturbed repeated prisoners’ dilemma. A public strategy σi of player i
isamapping σi:
 
t≥0Ht ×{2−i     L}→ ({C D}). Aperfectpublicequilibrium(PPE)
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in public strategies.
Fix B and consider { L
PD | L ≥ 1}.A sL goes to inﬁnity, the players will agree up to
any arbitrary order of beliefs that they play the standard prisoners’ dilemma with high
probability. The question we ask is as follows: when is it that an SPE of the complete
information game  PD approximately coincides with a PPE of the perturbed game  L
PD
for L large enough? We formalize this question with the following notion of robustness.
Definition1 (Robustnesswithrespectto L
PD). ApureSPEs∗ oftherepeatedprisoners’
dilemma  PD is robust to the class of perturbed games { L
PD | L ≥ 1} if, for every η>0,
there exists ¯ L such that, for every L ≥ ¯ L, the perturbed game  L
PD has a PPE σ∗ such that
Prob(σ∗(ht−1 ·) = s∗(ht−1)) ≥ 1−η for every t ≥ 1 and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1.7
7Here we view σ∗(ht−1 ·) as a random variable taking values in A.P r o b (σ∗(ht−1 ·) = s∗(ht−1)) consti-
tutes the probability-weighted average, across signals xt = (x1 t x2 t), of the weights given by the mixed-
strategy proﬁle σ∗(ht−1 xt) to the pure-action proﬁle s∗(ht−1).54 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Proposition 1 (Robustness of grim-trigger strategies). If δ/(1 − δ) > b − 1 + c,t h e n
grim-triggerstrategiesarerobusttotheclassofperturbedgames { L
PD | L ≥ 1}.C o n v e r s e l y ,
if δ/(1−δ) < b−1+c, then grim-trigger strategies are not robust to the class of perturbed
games { L





corresponds to outcome CC being strictly risk-dominant in the stage game augmented
with continuation values
CD
C 1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ) −c b
D b −c 0 0
Section 4 provides a one-shot robustness principle that extends this property to more
general environments.
Condition (1) highlights that losses c matter as much as the deviation temptation b
todeterminetherobustnessofcooperationingrim-triggerstrategies.8 Thisissupported
by the experimental evidence of Dal Bo and Frechette (forthcoming), and contrasts with
theconditionforcooperationtobesustainableundercompleteinformation, δ/(1−δ) ≥
b − 1, where losses c play no role in determining the feasibility of cooperation. As the
next section highlights, this difference can matter signiﬁcantly for applications.
2.3 Implications
2.3.1 Comparative statics We now illustrate how considerations of robustness can
change comparative statics by means of a simple example. We interpret the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma as a model of two ﬁrms in a joint venture. Each ﬁrm can either
put all its efforts in the joint venture (cooperate) or redirect some of its efforts to a side
project (defect). Imagine that payoffs are parameterized by the degree of interdepen-
dence I ∈[ 0 1] of the two ﬁrms, which is exogenously speciﬁed by the nature of the
joint venture project. Interdependence affects payoffs as follows
b = b0 −b1I
c = c0 +c1I 
where b0, b1, c0,a n dc1 are strictly positive, b0 − b1 > 1 (so that players may be tempted
to deviate even when I = 1), and b0 − c0 < 2 (so that cooperation is efﬁcient even when
I = 0). The greater the degree of interdependence I, the costlier it is for the two ﬁrms
to function independently. The cost of functioning independently depends on whether
8This effect also plays an important role in Blonski and Spagnolo (2004), Chassang (2010), and Chassang
and Padró i Miquel (2010).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 55
the ﬁrm abandons the joint venture ﬁrst or second. In particular, in many realistic en-
vironments, one may expect that c1 >b 1, i.e., upon unilateral defection, increased in-
terdependence hurts the defector less than the cooperator.9 The question is whether
greater interdependency facilitates the sustainability of cooperation.10
Under complete information, cooperation is sustainable under grim-trigger strate-
gies if and only if
δ
1−δ
≥ b−1 = b0 −1−b1I 
Greaterinterdependencereducesthevalueofunilateraldeviationsandhencefacilitates
the sustainability of cooperation. In contrast, grim-trigger strategies are robust to per-
turbations { L
PD | L ≥ 1} whenever
δ
1−δ
>b−1+c = b0 −1+c0 +(c1 −b1)I 
Hence, if c1 >b 1, then greater interdependence reduces the sustainability of coopera-
tion. Indeed, while greater interdependence diminishes the gains from unilateral de-
viation, it diminishes the payoffs of the player who still cooperates by an even greater
amount. In the perturbed game  L
PD, the losses from cooperating while one’s partner is
defecting loom large, and unambiguous comparative statics with respect to I are over-
turned if c1 >b 1. This preemptive motive for defection does not exist in the complete-
information environment, which highlights that taking robustness concerns seriously
can signiﬁcantly reﬁne our intuitions.11
2.3.2 Grim trigger, selective punishment, and robustness A closer look at condition (1)
suggests that grim-trigger strategies may not be the most robust way to sustain cooper-
ation. To see this, it is useful to distinguish predatory and preemptive incentives for de-
fection. Cooperationundergrim-triggerstrategiesisrobusttoperturbation{ L





Parameter b − 1 corresponds to a player’s predatory incentives, i.e., her incentives to
defect on an otherwise cooperative partner. Parameter c corresponds to a player’s pre-
emptive incentives, i.e., her incentives to defect on a partner whom she expects to de-
fect. The role played by b − 1 and c in Proposition 1 highlights that making predatory
incentives b − 1 small is good for robustness, but that making preemptive incentives c
high is bad for robustness. While grim-trigger strategies minimize predatory incentives,
9This is reasonably the case if the ﬁrst mover can prepare better and has time to reduce her dependency
on the other ﬁrm.
10Note that the analysis of Section 5 allows one to tackle this question for general strategies and the
results described here would be qualitatively similar.
11Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2010) make a similar point in the context of military deterrence using a
related framework.56 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
they also increase preemptive incentives: a player who cooperates while her opponent
defects suffers from long term punishment in addition to the short run cost c. More so-
phisticated strategies that punish defectors while rewarding cooperators might support
cooperationmorerobustly. Tomakethismorespeciﬁc,wenowconsideradifferentclass
of strategies, which we refer to as selective-punishment strategies.
Selective-punishment strategies are described by the following automaton. There
are four states: cooperation, C; punishment of player 1, P1; punishment of player 2, P2;
and defection, D. In state C prescribed play is CC; in state P1 prescribed play is CD;
in state P2 prescribed play is DC; in state D prescribed play is DD.I fp l a y e ri deviates
unilaterally from prescribed play, then the state moves to Pi. If both players deviate,
then the state moves to D. If both players play according to prescribed play, states C
and D do not change whereas state Pi remains Pi with probability ρ and moves to C
with probability 1 − ρ. In selective-punishment strategies, players selectively punish a
unilateral deviator while rewarding the player who is deviated upon.
Player i’s expected value in state Pi is denoted by vP and characterized by equation
vP =− c+δ(ρvP +(1−ρ)/(1−δ)).I fδ/(1−δ) > max{b−1 c},thenonecanpickρ ∈ (0 1)
suchthatselective-punishmentstrategiesareastrictSPE.Furthermore,bypicking ρ be-
low butclose to 1−c(1−δ)/δ, one can takevalue vP arbitrarily closeto 0 in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Robustness of selective-punishment strategies). I ft h ep a i ro fs e l e c t i v e -
punishment strategies forms a strict SPE of  PD,t h e ni ti sr o b u s tt ot h ec l a s so fp e r t u r b e d
games { L
PD | L ≥ 1}.12
By Propositions 1 and 2, if grim-trigger strategies are robust to { L
PD | L ≥ 1},t h e n
so are selective-punishment strategies, but not vice versa. The intuition for this is best
explained by writing explicitly the stage game augmented with continuation values in
state C:
CD
C 1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ) −c +δvR b+δvP
D b+δvP −c +δvR 0 0
where vR is player j’s expected value in state Pi and is characterized by vR = b+δ(ρvR +
(1−ρ)/(1−δ)). If the pair of selective-punishment strategies forms a strict SPE, then it
mustbethat1/(1−δ) > b+δvP andvP > 0.T h ef a c tt h a tvP > 0impliesthatδ/(1−δ) > c
and, since δvR >δ / ( 1−δ), it follows that playing C is a strictly dominant strategy of the
augmented stage game. Dominant strategies arerobust to smallamounts of incomplete
information.
Selective-punishment strategies decrease vP while increasing vR,a n dt h u sr e d u c e
both predatory and preemptive incentives to defect. In contrast, grim-trigger strategies
reduce predatory incentives but increase preemptive incentives.
12We say that an SPE is strict if at any history, a player’s action are a strict best response.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 57
2.4 The need for a general analysis
The example presented in this section shows that considering the impact of small per-
turbations in the information structure can suggest new and interesting insights on co-
operation. The question remains: how much of this analysis is speciﬁc to the class of
perturbations that we consider? Would selective-punishment strategies remain more
robust than grim-trigger strategies if we considered different classes of perturbations?
Can anything be said about general repeated games? Providing tractable answers to
these questions is valuable because much of the applied work on complete-information
repeated games focuses exclusively on predatory incentives and grim-trigger strategies;
see, for instance, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Bull (1987), Bagwell and Staiger (1990),
or Baker et al. (1994, 2002). Analyzing the implications of robustness concerns in these
models may yield signiﬁcant new insights.
The remainder of the paper provides a framework that allows us to study the
robustness to incomplete information without committing to a speciﬁc incomplete-
information perturbation. Since we build on KM and consider robustness to an en-
tire class of unspeciﬁed, small enough perturbations, the setup is necessarily quite ab-
stract. Still, we are able to provide a characterization of dynamically robust equilibria
that makes the analysis tractable and highlights how the intuitions developed in this
section generalize. To illustrate the applicability of our results, we characterize explicitly
the set of dynamically robust equilibrium values in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma for
any discount factor and provide a folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring.
3. Robustness in static games
This section deﬁnes and characterizes robust equilibria in static games. Section 4 lever-
ages these results by showing that the analysis of robustness in dynamic games can be
reduced to the analysis of robustness in families of static games augmented with con-
tinuation values.
3.1 Deﬁnitions
Consider a complete-information game G = (N (Ai gi)i∈N) with a ﬁnite set N =
{1     n} of players. Each player i ∈ N is associated with a ﬁnite set Ai of actions
and a payoff function gi:A → R,w h e r eA =
 
i∈N Ai is the set of action proﬁles. Let
a−i ∈ A−i =
 
j∈N\{i}Aj denote an action proﬁle for player i’s opponents. We use the
max norm for payoff functions: |gi|≡maxa∈A|gi(a)| and |g|≡maxi∈N |gi|. For a con-
stant d ≥ 0, a pure-action proﬁle a∗ = (a∗
i )i∈N ∈ A is a d-strict equilibrium if gi(a∗) ≥
gi(ai a∗
−i) + d for every i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai \{ a∗
i }. A Nash equilibrium is a 0-strict equilib-
rium; a strict equilibrium is a d-strict equilibrium for some d>0.
An elaboration U of game G is an incomplete-information game U = (N   P 
(Ai ui Qi)i∈N),w h e r e  is a countable set of states, P is a common prior over  ,a n d ,
for each player i ∈ N, ui:A ×   → R is her bounded state-dependent payoff function
and Qi is her information partition over  .L e t |u|≡supω∈ |u(· ω)|. For any ﬁnite
set X,l e t (X) denote the set of probability distributions over X. A mixed strategy58 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
of player i is a Qi-measurable mapping αi:  →  (Ai).13 The domain of ui extends
to mixed or correlated strategies in the usual way. Prior P and a proﬁle α = (αi)i∈N of




i∈N αi(ω)(ai) for each a ∈ A. A mixed-strategy proﬁle α∗ is a Bayesian–
Nashequilibriumif
 




i ∈ N and every Qi-measurable strategy αi of player i. The countability of   guarantees
the existence of Bayesian–Nash equilibria.
For ε ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0, we say that U is an (ε d)-elaboration of a complete-information
game G if, with probability at least 1 −ε, every player knows that her payoff function in
U is within distance d of her payoff function in G, i.e.,
P
  
ω ∈   |∀ i ∈ N ∀ω  ∈ Qi(ω) |ui(· ω )−gi|≤d
  
≥ 1−ε 
where Qi(ω) denotes the element of partition Qi that contains ω.
Definition 2 (Static robustness). For a constant d ≥ 0, a pure Nash equilibrium a∗ of
a complete-information game G is d-robust (to incomplete information) if, for every
η>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that every (ε d)-elaboration U of G has a Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium α∗ such that Pα∗
(a∗) ≥ 1−η.
A pure Nash equilibrium a∗ of G is strongly robust if it is d-robust for some d>0.14
In words, an equilibrium a∗ of G is strongly robust if every sufﬁciently close elab-
oration of G admits a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium that puts high probability on action
proﬁle a∗. Note that 0-robustness corresponds to robustness in the sense of KM.15
3.2 Sufﬁcient conditions for strong robustness
Because the set of elaborations we consider allows for small shocks with a large proba-
bility, a strongly robust equilibrium a∗ is necessarily strict. More precisely, the following
holds.
Lemma 1 (Strictness). For a constant d ≥ 0,i fap u r e - a c t i o np r o ﬁ l ea∗ is a d-robust equi-
librium of G,t h e na∗ is 2d-strict in G.
13With a slight abuse of terminology, we say that αi is Qi-measurable if it is measurable with respect to
the σ-algebra generated by Qi.
14To avoid unnecessary notations, we do not extend our deﬁnition of d-robustness to mixed equilibria
of G. If we did, a straightforward extension of Lemma 1 (below) would show that, in fact, all strongly robust
equilibria are pure.
15The notion of robustness for static games that we deﬁne here is a little more stringent than that of KM.
Indeed, in repeated games, the fact that payoffs can be perturbed with some small probability in future
periods implies that current expected continuation values can be slightly different from original contin-
uation values with large probability. To accommodate this feature, our notion of robustness allows for
elaborations that have payoffs close (instead of identical) to the payoffs of the complete-information game
with large probability. It can be shown that under weaker notions of robustness, the one-shot deviation
principle need not have a robust analogue.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 59
We now provide sufﬁcient conditions for an equilibrium a∗ to be robust. These con-
ditions essentially extend the results of KM to d-robustness with d>0.16 We begin with
t h ec a s ew h e r ea∗ is the unique correlated equilibrium of G.
Lemma 2 (Strong robustness of unique correlated equilibria). If a pure-action proﬁle a∗
is the unique correlated equilibrium of G and a∗ is strict, then a∗ is strongly robust in G.
A useful special case is the one where a∗ is the only equilibrium surviving iterated
elimination of strictly dominated actions. For d ≥ 0, we say that an action proﬁle a∗ is
an iteratively d-dominant equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence {Xi t}T
t=0 of action
sets with Ai = Xi 0 ⊇ Xi 1 ⊇···⊇Xi T ={ a∗
i } for each i ∈ N such that, at every stage t of
elimination with 1 ≤ t ≤ T,f o re a c hi ∈ N and ai ∈ Xi t−1 \ Xi t,t h e r ee x i s t sa 
i ∈ Xi t−1
such that gi(a 
i a−i)>g i(ai a−i)+d for all a−i ∈
 
j∈N\{i}Xj t−1.
Lemma 3 (Strong robustness of iteratively d-dominant equilibria). For a constant d ≥ 0,
if a pure-action proﬁle a∗ is an iteratively d-dominant equilibrium of G,t h e na∗ is d/2-
robust in G.
KM provide another sufﬁcient condition for robustness, which is particularly useful
in applied settings. Following KM, for a vector p = (p1     pn) ∈ (0 1]n, we say that an








for every i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai,a n dλ ∈  (A−i) such that λ(a∗
−i) ≥ pi.I nw o r d s ,a na c t i o np r o -
ﬁle a∗ is p-dominant if every player has incentives to play a∗
i when she believes that
the other players play a∗
−i with probability at least pi. A na c t i o np r o ﬁ l ea∗ is a strictly
p-dominant equilibrium of G if it is a strict and p-dominant equilibrium of G.K Me s -
tablish that every p-dominant equilibrium with
 
ipi < 1 is robust. This extends to the
case of strong robustness as follows.
Lemma 4 (Strong robustness of strictly p-dominant equilibria). If a pure-action proﬁle
a∗ is a strictly p-dominant equilibrium of G for a vector p = (p1     pn) with
 
ipi < 1,
then a∗ is strongly robust in G.
We know from KM (Lemma 5.5) that if a game has a strictly p-dominant equilibrium
with
 
ipi < 1, then no other action proﬁle is 0-robust. Combined with Lemma 4,t h i s
implies that if a game has a strictly p-dominant equilibrium with
 
ipi < 1,i ti st h e
unique strongly robust equilibrium. For example, in a two-by-two coordination game, a
strictly risk-dominant equilibrium is the unique strongly robust equilibrium.
16For additional sufﬁcient conditions ensuring the robustness of equilibria, see Ui (2001)o rMorris and
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4. Robustness in repeated games
In this section, we formulate a notion of robustness to incomplete information that is
appropriate for repeated games. We consider payoff shocks that are stochastically in-
dependent across periods. We show in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 that dynamically robust
equilibria admit a convenient recursive representation. Appendix A extends our results
to a larger class of correlated perturbations, provided that past large payoff shocks are
sufﬁciently public.
4.1 Deﬁnitions
Consideracomplete-informationgameG = (N (Ai gi)i∈N)aswellasapublicmonitor-
ing structure (Y π),w h e r eY is a ﬁnite set of public outcomes and π:A →  (Y) maps
action proﬁles to distributions over public outcomes. Keeping ﬁxed the discount factor
δ ∈ (0 1),l e t G denote the inﬁnitely repeated game with stage game G, discrete time
t ∈{ 1 2 3    }, and monitoring structure (Y π).17 For each t ≥ 1,l e tHt−1 = Yt−1 be the
set of public histories of length t − 1, corresponding to possible histories at the begin-
ning of period t.L e tH =
 
t≥1Ht be the set of all ﬁnite public histories. A pure public-
strategy of player i is a mapping si:H → Ai. Conditional on public history ht−1 ∈ H,a
public-strategy proﬁle s = (si)i∈N induces a distribution over sequences (at at+1    )of
future action proﬁles, which, in turn, induces continuation values vi(s|ht−1) such that
∀i ∈ N ∀ht−1 ∈ H  vi(s|ht−1) = E





A public-strategy proﬁle s∗ is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) if vi(s∗|ht−1) ≥
vi(si s∗
−i|ht−1) for every ht−1 ∈ H, i ∈ N, and public strategy si of player i (Fudenberg
et al. 1994). The restriction to public strategies corresponds to the assumption that al-
though player i observes her own actions ai as well as past stage-game payoffs gi(a) (or
perhaps noisy signals of gi(a)), she conditions her behavior only on public outcomes.
We deﬁne perturbations of  G as follows. Consider a sequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of
incomplete-information elaborations Ut = (N  t Pt (Ai uit Qit)i∈N) of G.W ed e ﬁ n e
the norm |U|≡supt∈N|ut|. Given a sequence U such that |U| < ∞, we denote by  U the
following inﬁnite-horizon game with public monitoring. In each period t, state ωt ∈  t
is generated according to Pt independently of past action proﬁles, past outcomes, and
past states. Each player i receives a signal according to her information partition Qit
and chooses action ait ∈ Ai. At the end of the period, an outcome y ∈ Y is drawn ac-
cording to π(at) and is publicly observed. A public strategy of player i is a mapping
σi:
 
t≥1Ht−1 ×  t →  (Ai) such that σi(ht−1 ·) is Qit-measurable for every public his-
tory ht−1 ∈ H.
Conditional on public history ht−1, a public-strategy proﬁle σ = (σi)i∈N induces a
probabilitydistributionoversequencesoffutureactionproﬁlesandstates,whichallows
17We omit indexing the game by its monitoring structure for conciseness. Note that this class of games
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us to deﬁne continuation values vi(σ|ht−1) such that
∀i ∈ N ∀ht−1 ∈ H  vi(σ|ht−1) = E





The assumption of uniformly bounded stage-game payoffs implies that the above in-
ﬁnite sum is well deﬁned. A public-strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a perfect public equilibrium
(PPE) if vi(σ∗|ht−1) ≥ vi(σi σ∗
−i|ht−1) for every ht−1 ∈ H, i ∈ N, and public strategy σi of
player i.
Definition 3 (Dynamic robustness). For a constant d ≥ 0,ap u r eP P Es∗ of the re-
peated game  G is d-robust if, for every η>0 and M>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such
that, for every sequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of (ε d)-elaborations of G with |U| <M,t h ep e r -
turbed game  U has a PPE σ∗ such that P
σ∗(ht−1 ·)
t (s∗(ht−1)) ≥ 1 − η for every t ≥ 1 and
ht−1 ∈ Ht−1.18
Ap u r eP P Es∗ of  G is strongly robust if it is d-robust for some d>0.
In words, we say that a PPE s∗ of repeated game  G is strongly robust if every re-
peated game with small independent perturbations admits a PPE that puts high proba-
bility on the action proﬁle prescribed by s∗ at every public history. Let V rob be the set of
all payoff proﬁles of strongly robust PPEs in  G.19
4.2 A one-shot robustness principle
We now relate the dynamic robustness of PPEs of  G to the robustness of one-shot ac-
tionproﬁlesinstaticgamesaugmentedwithcontinuationvalues. Thisyieldsaone-shot
robustness principle analogous to the one-shot deviation principle.
Given a stage game G and a one-period-ahead continuation-value proﬁle w:Y →
Rn contingent on public outcomes, let G(w) be the complete-information game aug-
mented with continuation values w, i.e., G(w) = (N (Ai g 
i)i∈N) such that g 
i(a) =
gi(a) + δE[wi(y)|a] for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A. For a strategy proﬁle s of repeated
game  G and a history h,l e tws h be the continuation-value proﬁle given by ws h(y) =
(vi(s|(h y)))i∈N for each y ∈ Y. By the one-shot deviation principle, s∗ is a PPE of re-
peated game  G if and only if s∗(h) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ws∗ h) for every h ∈ H
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, Theorem 4.2).
18As in footnote 7, P
σ∗(ht−1 ·)
t (s∗(ht−1)) is the expectation of the weights given by the mixed-strategy pro-
ﬁle σ∗(ht−1 ωt) to the pure-action proﬁle s∗(ht−1),w h e r eωt is drawn from  t according to Pt.
19Note that our deﬁnition of dynamic robustness considers only sequences U ={ Ut}t∈N of incomplete-
information games that are close to G uniformly over t. A possible alternative would be to require only
pointwise convergence of the sequence U ={ Ut}, i.e., that every Ut approach G. Our choice is motivated
by two main considerations. First, uniform convergence ensures that periods far apart in time remain
comparable. Second, requiring only pointwise convergence makes the robustness criterion so strong as
to make analysis uninteresting. For example, consider a stage game G with a unique Nash equilibrium a∗,
and perturbations UT ={ UT
t }t∈N such that UT
t is identical to G for t ≤ T and uT
it ≡ 0 for every i ∈ N and
t>T.F o re a c ht ≥ 1, UT
t converges to G as T →∞. Since game  UT has a ﬁnite effective horizon, it follows
from the standard backward induction that players play a∗ for the ﬁrst T periods in every PPE of  UT .T h u s
the only dynamically robust equilibrium of  G would be the repetition of a∗.62 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
ThenextlemmaextendsLemma1andshowsthatatanyhistory,theone-shotaction
proﬁle prescribed by a strongly robust PPE is a strict equilibrium of the appropriately
augmented stage game.
Lemma5(Strictnessinaugmentedgames). Foraconstantd ≥ 0,ifapure-strategyproﬁle
s∗ is a d-robust PPE of the repeated game  G, then the pure-action proﬁle s∗(h) is a 2d-
strict equilibrium of the augmented stage game G(ws∗ h) for every h ∈ H.
The following theorem relates strong robustness in  G to strong robustness in all
appropriately augmented stage games. This is the analogue of the one-shot deviation
principle for strongly robust PPEs.
Theorem 1 (One-shot robustness principle). Ap u r e - s t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l es∗ is a strongly ro-
bust PPE of the repeated game  G if and only if there exists a constant d>0 such that,
for every h ∈ H, the pure-action proﬁle s∗(h) is a d-robust equilibrium of the augmented
stage game G(ws∗ h).
This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A ﬁnite-automaton pure PPE s∗ is strongly robust in the repeated game
 G if and only if, for every h ∈ H, the pure-action proﬁle s∗(h) is strongly robust in the
augmented stage game G(ws∗ h). In particular, if the stage game G is a two-by-two game
and s∗ is a ﬁnite-automaton pure PPE of  G,t h e ns∗ is strongly robust if and only if, for
every h ∈ H, s∗(h) is strictly risk-dominant in G(ws∗ h).
The proof of Theorem 1 exploits heavily the fact that strong robustness is a notion of
robustness that holds uniformly over small neighborhoods of games.
4.3 Factorization
In this section, we use Theorem 1 to obtain a recursive characterization of V rob,t h e
set of strongly robust PPE payoff proﬁles. More precisely, we prove self-generation and
factorization results analogous to those of APS. We begin with a few deﬁnitions.
Definition 4 (Robust enforcement). For an action proﬁle a ∈ A, a vector of values
v ∈ Rn, a mapping w:Y → Rn from public signals to vectors of continuation values, and
ac o n s t a n td ≥ 0, w enforces (a v) d-robustly if a is a d-robust equilibrium of G(w) and
v = g(a)+δE[w(y)|a].
For v ∈ Rn, V ⊆ Rn,a n dd ≥ 0, v is d-robustly generated by V if there exist a ∈ A and
w:Y → V such that w enforces (a v) d-robustly.
Let Bd(V ) be the set of payoff proﬁles that are d-robustly generated by V . This is the
robust analogue of mapping B(V ) introduced by APS, where B(V ) is the set of all payoff
proﬁles v = g(a)+δE[w(y)|a] for a ∈ A and w:Y → V such that a is a Nash equilibrium
of G(w). We say that V is self-generating with respect to Bd if V ⊆ Bd(V ). We denote the
set of feasible values by F = (1/(1−δ))cog(A).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 63
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity). (i) If V ⊆ V   ⊆ F,t h e nBd(V ) ⊆ Bd(V  ) ⊆ F.
(ii) The mapping Bd admits a largest ﬁxed point V d among all subsets of F.
(iii) If V ⊆ F and V is self-generating with respect to Bd,t h e nV ⊆ V d.
Note that by deﬁnition Bd(V ) and V d are weakly decreasing in d with respect to set
inclusion. We characterize V rob using mapping Bd as follows.










The set of robust values V rob is the limit of the largest ﬁxed points V d of Bd as d goes
to 0. Corollary 2 corresponds to APS’s self-generation, factorization, and algorithm re-
sults (APS, Theorems 1, 2, and 5), which show that the set of all PPE payoff proﬁles is the
largestboundedﬁxedpointofthemapping B andcanbecomputedbyiterativelyapply-
ing B to F. Since we require robust enforcement at every stage, mapping B is replaced
by Bd.
5. Robustness in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma
In this section, we characterize strongly robust subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) pay-
off proﬁles in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring.20 We show
that whenever outcome (Defect Cooperate) can be enforced in an SPE under com-
plete information, the set of strongly robust SPE payoff proﬁles is essentially equal
to the set of SPE payoff proﬁles under complete information. Inversely, whenever
(Defect Cooperate) cannot be enforced in an SPE under complete information, even
if (Cooperate Cooperate) is enforcable in an SPE under complete information, the set
of strongly robust SPEs shrinks to permanent defection.21
Wealsoshowthatselective-punishmentstrategiesaremorerobustthangrim-trigger
strategies. In fact, whenever selective-punishment strategies form a strict SPE of the
complete-information games, then they are strongly robust. However, there exist more
sophisticated strategies that can sustain cooperation in circumstances where selective-
punishment strategies cannot.
As in Section 2, let PD denote the two-player prisoners’ dilemma with payoffs
CD
C 1 1 −c b
D b −c 0 0
20Note that, under perfect monitoring, PPEs simply correspond to SPEs.
21Generally, if (Defect Cooperate) is not enforced in an SPE under complete information, then the set
of SPE payoff proﬁles is either the payoff proﬁle of (Defect Defect) or the line segment between the payoff
proﬁles of (Defect Defect) and (Cooperate Cooperate).S e eAppendix B.11.64 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
where b>1, c>0,a n db − c<2. We also allow players to condition their behavior
on a continuous public randomization device.22 We are interested in  PD,t h er e p e a t e d
prisoners’ dilemma with public randomization devices and perfect monitoring.
5.1 Robust cooperation in grim-trigger strategies
As an illustration, we begin by studying the robustness of grim-trigger strategies. Un-
der complete information, grim-trigger strategies form an SPE if and only if δ/(1 − δ) ≥
b − 1. We showed that grim-trigger strategies are robust to the perturbations { L
PD |
L ≥ 1} considered in Section 2 whenever δ/(1 − δ) > b − 1 + c. We now show that this
condition guarantees strong robustness in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.
The proof follows from the one-shot robustness principle (Theorem 1), which states
that an SPE is strongly robust if and only if every prescribed action proﬁle is strongly ro-
bust in the stage game augmented with continuation values. In the case of grim-trigger
strategies, this boils down to checking that CC is strictly risk-dominant in
CD
C 1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ) −c b
D b −c 0 0
This is equivalent to condition (1)o fSection 2, i.e., δ/(1 − δ) > b − 1 + c. Returning to
theclassofperturbationsstudiedinSection2,thismeansthatgrim-triggerstrategiesare
robusttoperturbations{ L
PD | L ≥ 1}whenevertheyarerobusttoallsmallperturbations.
5.2 Characterizing strongly robust SPEs
Our characterization of strongly robust SPEs in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma is in
three steps. First, we provide a classiﬁcation of prisoners’ dilemma games under com-
plete information. Then we prove a fragility result that shows that if total surplus is so
low that a player would never accept to cooperate while the other defects, then the only
strongly robustSPEisforplayerstodefectateveryhistory. In contrast, ifthereis enough
surplus so that one player may accept to cooperate while the other defects in some pe-
riod, then essentially every SPE value under complete information can be sustained by
a strongly robust SPE.
5.2.1 A classiﬁcation of prisoners’ dilemma games We classify prisoners’ dilemma
games according to the enforceability of action proﬁles. We say that action proﬁle a
is enforceable under complete information in  PD if there exists an SPE of  PD that pre-
scribes a at some history.
Definition 5 (Classiﬁcation of prisoners’ dilemma games). Fix δ.W e d e ﬁ n e f o u r
classes of prisoners’ dilemma games, GDC/CC, GDC, GCC,a n dG∅, as follows:
22Formally, the framework of Section 4 covers only ﬁnite public randomization devices. See Appendix C
for a description of the measurability conditions necessary to extend our analysis to continuous public
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Figure 1. Classiﬁcation of prisoners’ dilemma games.
(i) Class GDC/CC is the class of PD such that DC and CC are enforceable under com-
plete information in  PD.
(ii) Class GDC is the class of PD such that DC is enforceable under complete infor-
mation in  PD,b u tCC is not.
(iii) Class GCC is the class of PD such that CC is enforceableunder completeinforma-
tion in  PD,b u tDC is not.
(iv) Class G∅ is the class of PD such that neither DC nor CC is enforceable under
complete information in  PD.
Note that DD is always enforceable under complete information. Stahl (1991)c h a r -
acterizes explicitly the set V SPE of SPE payoff proﬁles under complete information as a
function of parameters δ, b,a n dc (Appendix B.11). See Figure 1 for a representation of
classes of prisoners’ dilemma games as a function of b and c,f o rδ ﬁxed.
Stahl (1991)s h o w st h a t ,i fP D∈ GDC/CC,t h e nV SPE = co{(0 0) (1/(1 − δ) 
1/(1−δ)) (0 φ) (φ 0)} with φ ≥ 1/(1−δ). This means that, for PD ∈ GDC/CC,i ti sp o s -
sible to punish one player while giving the other one her maximum continuation value.
If PD ∈ GDC,t h e nV SPE = co{(0 0) (0 (b−c)/(1−δ)) ((b−c)/(1−δ) 0)}.23 Finally, we
have that if PD ∈ GCC,t h e nV SPE = co{(0 0) (1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ))}, and if PD ∈ G∅,t h e n
V SPE ={ (0 0)}.
5.2.2 A fragility result The following proposition shows that if DC is not enforceable
under complete information, then the only strongly robust SPE is permanent defec-
tion.
Proposition 3 (Fragile equilibria). Fix a discount factor δ<1.I f PD ∈ GCC, then the
only strongly robust SPE of  PD is permanent defection and V rob ={ (0 0)}.
23Note that if PD ∈ GDC,t h e nb>c.66 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exist a strongly robust SPE s∗
of  PD and a public history h such that s∗(h)  = DD. Since PD ∈ GCC, s∗ is necessarily
strongly symmetric, i.e., it prescribes only action proﬁles CC or DD. This implies that
s∗(h) = CC and that, for every action proﬁle a, players have identical continuation val-
ues following history (h a). Furthermore, we have c>δ / ( 1 − δ); otherwise, DC would
be enforceable under complete information.
Givencontinuationvaluesw,theaugmentedgamePD(w)athistoryhtakestheform
CD
C 1+δwCC 1+δwCC −c +δwCD b+δwCD
D b+δwDC −c +δwDC δwDD δwDD
where wCC, wCD, wDC,a n dwDD are in [0 1/(1−δ)]. Note that CC is a Nash equilibrium
ofPD(w)sinces∗ isanSPEof PD.A c t i o np r o ﬁ l eDDisalsoaNashequilibriumofPD(w)
because c>δ / ( 1−δ), wDD −wCD ≥− 1/(1−δ),a n dwDD −wDC ≥− 1/(1−δ).
We now show that DD is strictly risk-dominant in PD(w), i.e., that
(δwDD +c −δwCD)(δwDD +c −δwDC)
>( 1+δwCC −b−δwCD)(1+δwCC −b−δwDC) 
(2)
Note that each bracket term of (2) is nonnegative because CC and DD are Nash equilib-
ria of PD(w). Also note that δwDD + c>1 + δwCC − b because b>1, c>δ / ( 1 − δ),a n d
wDD −wCC ≥− 1/(1−δ). Since the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side term
by term, (2)i ss a t i s ﬁ e d .
Since DD is strictly risk-dominant in PD(w), by KM (Lemma 5.5), CC is not 0-robust
in PD(w). This contradicts Theorem 1.  
5.2.3 A robustness result W en o ws h o wt h a ti fDC is enforceable under complete infor-
mation,thenV rob isessentiallyequaltoV SPE. Indeed,ifactionproﬁleDC isenforceable
under complete information, then, essentially every payoff proﬁle v ∈ V SPE can be sus-
tained by an SPE that satisﬁes the following remarkable property, which we call iterative
stage dominance.24
Lemma 7 (Iterative stage dominance). Fix a discount factor δ<1.I f e i t h e r PD ∈
intGDC/CC and v ∈{ (0 0) (1/(1 − δ) 1/(1 − δ))}∪intV SPE or PD ∈ intGDC and
v ∈{ (0 0)}∪intV SPE, then there exist a constant d>0 and an SPE s∗ of  PD with pay-
off proﬁle v such that, for every public history h, s∗(h) is iteratively d-dominant in the
augmented stage game PD(ws∗ h).25
24This property is related to Miller’s (2009) notion of ex post equilibrium in repeated games of adverse
selection, but allows for iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
25We identify a prisoners’ dilemma game by its parameters (b c) ∈ R2, so the interior of a class of pris-
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The detailed proof of Lemma 7 is lengthy, but the main idea of the argument is
straightforward. We show that, for every SPE, its off-path behavior can be modiﬁed so
that at each history, the prescribed action proﬁle is iteratively dominant in the appro-
priately augmented stage game. The proof exploits the fact that payoff proﬁles in V SPE
allow us to punish one player while rewarding the other.
As an example, consider PD in the interior of GDC/CC and grim-trigger strategies. On
the equilibrium path, CC is a Nash equilibrium of
CD
C 1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ) −c b
D b −c 0 0
Because DD is also an equilibrium of this game, CC is not iteratively dominant. This
can be resolved by changing continuation strategies upon outcomes CD and DC.
By Stahl’s characterization, we know that V SPE takes the form co{(0 0) (1/(1 − δ) 
1/(1 − δ)) (0 φ) (φ 0)},w h e r eφ ≥ 1/(1 − δ). Consider any public history of the form
(CC     CC CD).26 The grim-trigger strategy prescribes permanent defection. We re-
place this continuation strategy by an SPE sCD that attains (φ 0) so that only the devi-
ator is punished upon unilateral deviation. We also replace the continuation strategy
after (CC     CC DC) by an SPE sDC that attains (0 φ). Then the augmented game
after (CC     CC)becomes
CD
C 1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ) −c +δφ b
D b −c +δφ 0 0
By assumption, CD and DC are enforceable under complete information, so −c +
δφ ≥ 0.T h u sC is weakly dominant for both players in this augmented game. Because
PD ∈ intGDC/CC, C is, in fact, strictly dominant. The difﬁcult part of the proof is to show
thatstrategyproﬁles sCD and sDC canbefurthermodiﬁedsothattheirprescribedaction
proﬁles become iteratively dominant in corresponding augmented stage games as well.
Thefollowing proposition followsdirectlyfrom Lemma3, Theorem1,a n dLemma7.










∪intV SPE ⊆ V rob ⊆ V SPE 
If PD ∈ intGDC,t h e n
{(0 0)}∪intV SPE ⊆ V rob ⊆ V SPE 
Note that if selective-punishment strategies described in Section 2 form a strict SPE
undercompleteinformation,thentheysatisfytheiterativestage-dominancepropertyof
26We omit public randomizations to simplify notation.68 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Lemma 7 and hence sustain cooperation in a robust way. Selective-punishment strate-
giesarestronglyrobustunderalargersetofparameters(δ b c)thangrim-triggerstrate-
gies. However, DC may be enforceable under complete information even if b − 1 <
δ/(1−δ) < c and hence selective-punishment strategies are not an SPE (see Stahl 1991).
Even in such circumstances, Proposition 4 guarantees the possibility of sustaining co-
operation robustly, but the strategies used are more sophisticated.27
6. A folk theorem in strongly robust PPEs
In this section, we prove a folk theorem in strongly robust PPEs, which is an analogue
of Fudenberg et al. (1994; henceforth FLM) but requires stronger identiﬁability condi-
tions on the monitoring structure. Under these conditions, we show that every interior
point of the set of feasible and individually rational payoff proﬁles can be sustained by
some strongly robust PPE for δ sufﬁciently close to 1. It implies that if public outcomes
are informative, then, as δ goes to 1, requiring robustness does not impose any essential
restriction on the set of equilibrium payoff proﬁles. A useful corollary is that, for dis-
count factor high enough, if the set of feasible and individually rational payoff proﬁles
is full dimensional, then there exist strongly robust PPEs. This is a valuable result since
the existence of robust equilibria is not guaranteed in static games (see Example 3.1 in
KM).WealsoprovideanexampleinwhichthefolktheoreminstronglyrobustPPEsdoes
not hold under FLM’s weaker identiﬁability conditions. This occurs because robustness
constraints require us to control continuation payoffs upon joint deviations rather than
just unilateral deviations.
Themonitoringstructure(Y π)hasstrongfullrank if{π(·|a) ∈ RY | a ∈ A}islinearly
independent. The strong full rank condition implies |Y|≥| A|.C o n v e r s e l y ,i f|Y|≥| A|,
then the strong full rank condition is generically satisﬁed. As its name suggests, the
strong full rank condition is more demanding than FLM’s pairwise full rank condition
for all pure action proﬁles.











the set of feasible and individually rational values normalized to stage-game units. Note
that we use pure-action minimax values since strongly robust PPEs are pure. We denote
by NV rob(δ) ≡ (1 − δ)V rob the set of normalized strongly robust PPE payoff proﬁles in
 G givendiscountfactorδ. Thenormalizationby(1−δ)ensuresthatequilibriumvalues
are also expressed in ﬁxed stage-game units. The following result holds.
Theorem 2 (Folk theorem). For every discount factor δ<1, NV rob(δ) ⊆ NV ∗.I f t h e
monitoring structure (Y π) has strong full rank, then, for every compact subset K of
intNV ∗, there exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ>δ, K ⊆ NV rob(δ).
27The proof of Lemma 7 provides a description of such strategies. Since δ/(1 − δ) < c, it is not possible
to enforce DC by promising the cooperating player permanent cooperation in the future. However, it may
be possible to enforce DC by promising the cooperating player that play will be CD for sufﬁciently many
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We now describe an example that shows that the folk theorem in strongly robust
PPEs may fail if the strong full rank condition is not satisﬁed. Consider the two-by-two
game G0 with action sets A1 = A2 ={ L R} and public outcomes Y ={ yL yR yM}.I f
both players choose the same action a ∈{ L R}, then signal ya is realized with certainty.
If player 1 chooses L and player 2 chooses R, then signal yM is realized with certainty. If
player 1 chooses R and player 2 chooses L, then all signals are realized with equal prob-
ability. Note that FLM’s pairwise full rank condition is satisﬁed for every pure-action
proﬁle, but the strong full rank condition is not. Expected stage-game payoffs for game
G0 are given by
LR
L 3 30  1
R 1 00  0
so that minimax values are 0 for both players.28 The following result holds.
Proposition 5 (Failure of the folk theorem). In the repeated game  G0, for every dis-
countfactorδ<1,ifanormalizedpayoffproﬁle(v1 v2)isinNV rob(δ),thenv1−v2 ≤ 1/2.
ThisimpliesthatNV rob(δ)isboundedawayfrom(1 0)sothatthefolktheoremdoes
not hold in strongly robust PPEs for this game. Again, this occurs because robustness
constraints require us to control continuation payoffs upon joint deviations rather than
just unilateral deviations. Our counterexample is closely related to the counterexample
developed by FLM when the pairwise full rank condition is not satisﬁed, but differs in
subtle ways. Fudenberg et al. (1994) are able to construct a counterexample in which
PPE payoff proﬁles are bounded away from a feasible and individually rational payoff
proﬁle in the direction of (1 1). Here, we show that strongly robust PPE payoff proﬁles
areboundedawayfromafeasibleandindividuallyrationalpayoffproﬁleinthedirection
of(1 −1). Thereasonforthisisthat,uponunilateraldeviation,continuationpayoffpro-
ﬁles that enforce LL along the line orthogonal to (1 1) punish the deviator but reward
the player who behaved appropriately. This enforces behavior in dominant actions, and
hence robustly. In contrast, upon unilateral deviation, continuation payoff proﬁles that
enforce RL along the line orthogonal to (1 −1) punish both the deviator and the player
who behaved appropriately. This reduces the robustness of RL and enables us to con-
struct a counterexample. If the strong full rank condition were satisﬁed and a fourth
informative signal allowed us to identify joint deviations, then we could enforce RL in
dominant actions by making continuation payoff proﬁles upon joint deviations partic-
ularly low.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to study the robustness of repeated games strategies
without committing to a speciﬁc incomplete-information perturbation, and highlights
the applied implications of robustness considerations.
28These expected payoffs can be associated with outcome-dependent realized payoffs ri(ai y) of 3 if
y = yL,o f−3 if (i ai y)= (2 L yM),o f1 if (i ai y)= (2 R yM), and 0 otherwise.70 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Our main technical contribution is the one-shot robustness principle, which re-
duces the analysis of a robust equilibrium of a dynamic game to the analysis of robust
equilibria in an appropriate family of static games. This implies a factorization result for
strongly robust PPE values. We show the practical value of these characterizations by
means of two examples.
First, we compute explicitly the set of strongly robust SPE values in the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained by a strongly robust
SPE if and only if both (Cooperate Cooperate) and (Defect Cooperate) are enforceable
under complete information. In the spirit of Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2010), we
also show that concerns of robustness can signiﬁcantly affect comparative statics. Fi-
nally, our analysis implies that selective-punishment strategies are more effective than
grim-trigger strategies in sustaining cooperation in strongly robust SPEs. This occurs
because grim-trigger strategies minimize predatory incentives but increase preemptive
incentives. In contrast, selective-punishment strategies minimize both predatory and
preemptive incentives.
Second, we prove a folk theorem in strongly robust PPEs for repeated games with
imperfect public monitoring under the strong full rank condition. The identiﬁability
conditions we use are stronger than those of FLM because robustness requires us to
control all continuation values upon joint deviations, rather than just upon unilateral
deviations.
Our approach is necessarily dependent on the class of perturbations against which
we test for robustness. While we think of the class of perturbations we consider as a
natural and informative benchmark, one may reasonably worry whether studying other
classes of perturbations would lead to very different results. In this respect, it is infor-
mative to note that our results are unchanged if players have almost common priors or
when payoff shocks are correlated across periods but private information is short lived.
Appendix A: Extensions
The notion of dynamic robustness we develop in Section 4 depends on the class of per-
turbations against which we test for robustness. In particular, we assume that players
share a common prior and that perturbations are independent across periods. In this
section, we discuss ways in which our framework can be extended to accommodate
noncommon priors and persistent shocks.
A.1 Noncommon priors
This section considers two different classes of perturbations with noncommon priors,
depending on how much variation in priors is allowed across players. First, we show
that our analysis of robustness to incomplete information is unchanged even if players
have priors that are different but close to each other. We then discuss cases in which the
players’ priors may differ signiﬁcantly.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 71
A.1.1 Approximately common priors Consider an incomplete-information game (U 
(Pi)i∈N)withnoncommonpriors,whereU = (N   P (Ai ui Qi)i∈N)isanincomplete-
informationgamewithan“objective”prior P over  ,a n dPi isplayer i’s prior over  .L e t
m(P Pi) = sup
ω∈ 
 






   
 
with a convention that q/0 =∞for q>0 and 0/0 = 1.T h et e r mm(P Pi) measures the
proximity between the objective prior and player i’s prior.
Definition 6 (Static robustness with almost common priors). For a constant d ≥ 0,a
pure Nash equilibrium a∗ of a complete-information game G is d-robust to incomplete
information with almost common priors if, for every η>0 and M>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0
such that, for every (ε d)-elaboration U of G with |u| <Mand proﬁle of noncommon
priors (Pi)i∈N with m(P Pi) ≤ ε for every i ∈ N, the perturbed game (U (Pi)i∈N) has a
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium α∗ such that Pα∗
(a∗) ≥ 1−η.
A pure Nash equilibrium a∗ of G is strongly robust to incomplete information with
almost common priors if it is d-robust to incomplete information with almost common
priors for some d>0.
Thefollowinglemmashowsthatallowingfornoncommonpriorswithsmallm(P Pi)
does not affect strong robustness in static games.
Lemma 8 (Static equivalence of common and almost common priors). If d>d   > 0 and
apureNashequilibrium a∗ of G is d-robusttoincompleteinformationwithcommonpri-
orsin G,t h e na∗ is d -robusttoincompleteinformationwithalmostcommonpriorsin G.
Hence, strong robustness in the sense of Deﬁnition 6 is equivalent to that of Deﬁnition 2.
Oyama and Tercieux (2010, Proposition 5.7) provide a similar result for p-dominant
equilibria. We extend the deﬁnition of dynamic robustness given in Section 4 as follows.
Definition 7 (Dynamic robustness with almost common priors). For a constant d ≥ 0,
ap u r eP P Es∗ of the repeated game  G is d-robust to incomplete information with al-
most common priors if, for every η>0 and M>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that, for
everysequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of (ε d)-elaborationsof G with |U| <Mandeverysequence
{(Pit)i∈N}t∈N of noncommon priors with m(Pt Pit) ≤ ε for every i ∈ N and t ≥ 1, the in-
duced dynamic incomplete-information game with noncommon priors has a PPE σ∗
such that P
σ∗(ht−1 ·)
t (s∗(ht−1)) ≥ 1−η for every t ≥ 1 and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1.
ApurePPEs∗ of G isstronglyrobusttoincompleteinformationwithalmostcommon
priors if it is d-robust for some d>0.
Similarly to Theorem 1, the one-shot robustness principle holds. Namely, a PPE is
strongly robust to incomplete information with almost common priors in  G if and only
if there exists d>0 such that, for every h ∈ H, s∗(h) is d-robust to incomplete informa-
tion with almost common priors in G(ws∗ h). Therefore, Theorem 1 and Lemma 8 imply
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Proposition 6 (Dynamic equivalence of common and almost common priors). If a
pure PPE is strongly robust to incomplete information with common priors, then it is also
strongly robust to incomplete information with almost common priors. Hence, strong
robustness in the sense of Deﬁnition 7 is equivalent to that of Deﬁnition 3.
A.1.2 General noncommon priors In the case where players have signiﬁcantly differ-
ent priors (Pi)i∈N, in the sense that m(P Pi) is large, robustness to such perturbations is
amuchmorestringentrequirementthanrobustnesstocommon-priorperturbations. In
agenericstaticgame,OyamaandTercieux(2010)showthataNashequilibriumisrobust
to incomplete information with noncommon priors if and only if it is iteratively domi-
nant. One can extend their result to dynamic settings and show that a PPE is strongly
robust to incomplete information with noncommon priors if and only if it is iteratively
stage-dominant. Someofourresultsstillapplyinthiscase. Forinstance, intherepeated
prisoners’dilemma,ourcharacterizationofstronglyrobustSPEvaluesreliesoniterative
stage dominance (Lemma 7). As a consequence, the set of strongly robust SPE values is
essentially the same whether we assume common priors or not. Similarly, the folk theo-
rem (Theorem 2) holds without the common prior assumption because our proof relies
only on iterative stage dominance.
A.2 Persistent shocks
We now extend the class of perturbations against which we test robustness to allow for
payoff shocks that are correlated across periods. We show that our notion of robust-
ness is unchanged if asymmetric information is short lived as long as the players are in
“normal” states of the world (where “normal” will be made precise shortly).
Theclassofcorrelatedperturbationsweconsiderisdescribedasfollows. Inaddition
to payoff-relevant states ωt and information sets Qi t, we allow players to observe public
signals zt ∈ Zt,w h e r eZt is countable. We refer to zt as regimes and denote by Z∗




t≥1( t × Zt). Distribution P may exhibit signiﬁcant correlation between states
(ωt)t∈N.
We say that P is ε-persistent along normal regimes if
 
   
 
P(ωt|z1 ω1     zt−1 ωt−1 zt)
P(ωt|z1     zt)
−1
 
   
  ≤ ε
for every t ≥ 1 and (z1 ω1     zt ωt) ∈
 t
τ=1(Z∗
τ ×  τ). In words, if players have always
beeninnormalregimes,thenconditionalonpastregimes,privateinformationoverpast
states does not affect beliefs over the current state much. Note that once an abnormal
regime is reached, past private information may become very relevant.
A sequence ˆ U = (N ( t (Ai uit Qit)i∈N Zt)t∈N P) of incomplete-information
games that embed G with intertemporal correlation P is a sequence of correlated (ε d)-
elaborations of G if P is ε-persistent along normal regimes and, conditional on eachTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 73
sequence (z1     zt) ∈
 t
τ=1Z∗
τ of past normal regimes, the stage game is close to G
with high probability, i.e.,
P
  
ωt ∈  t |∀ i ∈ N ∀ω 
t ∈ Qit(ωt) |uit(· ω 
t)−gi|≤d
 
|z1     zt
 
≥ 1−ε 
a n dar e g i m ei nt h en e x tp e r i o di sn o r m a lw i t hh i g hp r o b a b i l i t y ,i . e . ,P(zt+1 ∈ Z∗
t+1 |
z1     zt) ≥ 1−ε. Note that this need only hold conditional on past regimes being nor-
mal. In particular, abnormal regimes can be arbitrarily persistent.
Example. The class of correlated (ε d)-elaborations includes the following perturbed
prisoners’ dilemma. In each period, players have private information over whether the
game will stop next period. More formally, in each period t,as t a t eωt ∈{ 1     L L+
1} is drawn, players observe a public signal zt = ωt−1 and a private signal xi t,w h e r e
x1 t = ωt and x2 t = ωt − ξt,w i t hξt an even coin ﬂip over {0 1}. Conditional on any
ωt−1 ∈{ 1     L−1}, ωt belongs to {1     L−1} with high probability. If ωt−1 = L,t h e n
ωt = L + 1. Finally, state L + 1 is absorbing. This information structure is ε-persistent
along normal regimes {1     L− 1}. In states ωt ∈{ 1     L}, payoffs are those of the
original prisoners’ dilemma. In state L + 1, all payoffs are identically 0. State L + 1
corresponds to the de facto end of the game. In state L, player 1 knows that the game
will end next period, while player 2 may be uncertain. ♦
Proposition 7 shows that robustness against such correlated (ε d)-elaborations is
equivalent to robustness against independent (ε d)-elaborations. We say that a public
history ht−1 is normal if and only if all past regimes are normal (i.e., for all s ≤ t − 1,
zs ∈ Z∗
s ).
Definition 8 (Dynamic robustness with persistent shocks). For a constant d ≥ 0,a
pure PPE s∗ of the repeated game  G is d-robust to persistent incomplete information
with public regimes if, for every η>0 and M<∞,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that, for every
sequence ˆ U of correlated (ε d)-elaborations of G with | ˆ U| <M, the induced dynamic
incomplete-information game has an equilibrium that puts probability at least 1−η on
s∗(ht−1) at every normal public history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Ap u r eP P Es∗ of  G is strongly robust to persistent incomplete information with pub-
lic regimes if it is d-robust to persistent incomplete information with public regimes for
some d>0.
Conditional on each public history, players may have different priors over current
payoff shocks because they have observed different past signals. However, as long as
past public regimes are normal, their beliefs over the current state will be close in the
sense of Appendix A.1. Therefore, Proposition 6 implies the following.
Proposition 7 (Equivalence of perturbation classes). If a PPE is strongly robust to in-
dependentincompleteinformation, thenitisalsostronglyrobusttopersistentincomplete
information with public regimes. Hence, strong robustness in the sense of Deﬁnition 8 is
equivalent to that of Deﬁnition 3.74 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Thisshowsthatcorrelationsacrossshocksdonotchangeournotionofrobustnessas
long as asymmetric information is short lived while players are in normal regimes. Note
that this result no longer holds if asymmetric information is long lived. For instance, if
there is durable asymmetric information over past payoff shocks, then the literature on
reputation shows that always defecting in the prisoners’ dilemma need not remain an
equilibrium. In contrast, because always defecting satisﬁes iterative stage dominance, it
is clearly robust to the class of perturbations we consider in the paper.29
Appendix B: Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst consider the case where δ/(1 − δ) > b − 1 + c. Theorem 1 (given in Section 4.2)
shows that a sufﬁcient condition for the robustness of grim-trigger strategies is that at
every history, the prescribed one-shot action proﬁle be strictly risk-dominant in the
stage game augmented with continuation values. In the case of grim-trigger strategies,
this condition boils down to checking that CC is strictly risk-dominant in
CD
C 1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ) −c b
D b −c 0 0
which is equivalent to δ/(1−δ) > b−1+c.
We now turn to the case where δ/(1−δ) < b−1+c and show that, in this case, grim-
trigger strategies are not robust with respect to { L
PD | L ≥ 1}. Indeed, if grim-trigger
strategies are robust to { L
PD | L ≥ 1}, then, for L large enough,  L
PD has a PPE σ∗ that
is close to grim-trigger strategies at every history. Let vi(σ∗|a) denote player i’s con-
tinuation payoff under σ∗ after action proﬁle a in the ﬁrst period. Since σ∗ is arbitrar-
ily close to grim-trigger strategies, for B>0 ﬁxed and L large, vi(σ∗|CC) is arbitrarily
close to 1,a n dvi(σ∗|CD), vi(σ∗|DC),a n dvi(σ∗|DD) are arbitrarily close to 0. Since
δ/(1−δ) < b−1+c, we can insure that, for L large enough,
1+δvi(σ∗|CC)−c +δvi(σ∗|DC) < b+δvi(σ∗|CD)+δvi(σ∗|DD)  (3)
The rest of the proof shows by induction that both players play D in the ﬁrst pe-
riod under σ∗, which contradicts the robustness of grim-trigger strategies. If player 1
observes signal L, then, since B is sufﬁciently large, playing D is dominant for him. If
player 2 observes signal L, she puts probability 1 on player 1 having observed signal L
and playing D, and hence her best reply is to play D. Assume that if player 1 observes
signal k, then he plays D. If player 2 observes signal k − 1, then she puts probability at
least 1/2 on player 1 having observed k. By the induction hypothesis, this implies that
she puts probability at least 1/2 on player 1 playing D.T h u s ,b y( 3), her best reply is to
29See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a review of the reputation literature. See also Angeletos et al.
(2007) for an analysis of the learning patterns that arise in a dynamic game of regime change where funda-
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play D. Similarly, if player 1 observes signal k − 1, he puts probability 1/2 on player 2
having observed k−1 and playing D.B y( 3), his best reply is to play D.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Similarly to the ﬁrst half of Proposition 1, Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 3 and The-
orem 1. Indeed it is straightforward to check that at any history, the prescribed equilib-
rium action proﬁle is iteratively dominant in the stage game augmented with continua-
tion values.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the game G  = (N (Ai g 
i)i∈N) such that, for every i ∈ N, g 
i(a) = gi(a) + d for
a  = a∗ and g 
i(a∗) = gi(a∗) − d. Since G  is a (0 d)-elaboration of G, G  admits a Nash
equilibrium arbitrarily close to a∗. By the closedness of the set of Nash equilibria, a∗ is
also a Nash equilibrium of G . Therefore, a∗ is a 2d-strict equilibrium of G.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is by contradiction and follows the structure of KM (Proposition 3.2). It uses
Lemmas 9 and 10, which are of independent interest and are given below.
Definition 9 (Canonical normalization). Consider an incomplete-information game
U = (N   P (Ai ui Qi)i∈N) and a strategy proﬁle α∗ of U.W e c a l l˜ U = (N  ˜    ˜ P 
(Ai  ˜ ui  ˜ Qi)i∈N) the canonical normalization of U with respect to α∗ if
(i) ˜   = A
(ii) for ˜ ω = a, ˜ P(˜ ω) = Pα∗
(a)
(iii) ˜ Qi ={ { ai}×A−i | ai ∈ Ai}
(iv) for ˜ ω ∈{ ai}×A−i,
˜ ui(a 










if the denominator on the right-hand side is nonzero, and ˜ ui(·  ˜ ω) = gi other-
wise.30
We say that ˜ αi is truthtelling in ˜ U if ˜ αi( ˜ ω)(ai) = 1 whenever ˜ ω ∈{ ai}×A−i.
Lemma 9 (Canonical normalization with respect to a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium). Let
˜ U be the canonical normalization of U with respect to α∗.
(i) If U is an (ε d)-elaboration of G with payoffs bounded by M,t h e n ˜ U is an (˜ ε  ˜ d)-
elaboration of G,w h e r e˜ ε = nε1/2 and ˜ d = d +ε1/2(|g|+M).
30The denominator is nonzero ˜ P-almost surely.76 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(ii) If α∗ is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of U, then truthtelling is a Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium of ˜ U.




ω ∈   |∀ i ∈ N ∀ω  ∈ Qi(ω) |ui(· ω )−gi|≤d
 
 
Since U is an (ε d)-elaboration, P( d) ≥ 1 − ε.L e tA 









and let A  =
 
i∈N A 
i. We will show that, in ˜ U,e v e r yp l a y e ri knows that ˜ ui is close to gi
on the event of A  and ˜ P(A ) is high.
For ˜ ω = a ∈ A , i ∈ N,a n d ˜ ω  ∈ ˜ Qi(ω) ={ ai}×A−i,w eh a v e






















i (ω)(ai)P(ω) > 0,a n d|˜ ui(·  ˜ ω )−gi|=0 ≤ ˜ d otherwise.
I nt h ec a s eo fε = 0,w eh a v e ˜ P(A ) = 1 since A 
i = Ai for every i ∈ N.I nt h ec a s eo f
ε>0,f o re a c hai ∈ Ai \A 








Summing up both sides for all ai ∈ Ai \A 
i,w eh a v e















i (ω)(ai)P(ω) = ε1/2 ˜ P((Ai \A 
i)×A−i);
thus ˜ P((Ai \ A 
i) × A−i) ≤ ε1/2.T h u s ,˜ P(A ) ≥ 1 −
 
i ˜ P((Ai \ A 
i) × A−i) ≥ 1 − nε1/2 =
1−˜ ε.  
The point of canonical normalization is that, given a set of players and an action
space, they form a ﬁnite-dimensional class of games.
Lemma 10 (Locally unique equilibrium). If a∗ is a strict equilibrium of G and G has no
other correlated equilibrium, then there exists d>0 such that the unique Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium of any (0 d)-elaboration of G is to play a∗ with probability 1.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 77
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that, for any d>0,t h e r ee x i s ta(0 d)-
elaboration Ud = (N  d Pd (Ai uid Qid)i∈N) of G and a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium
αd ofUd suchthatP
αd
d (a∗)<1. Sincethecanonicalnormalizationofa(0 d)-elaboration
of G is also a (0 d)-elaboration of G by Lemma 9, without loss of generality, we can
assume that Ud takes a canonical form and that αd is truthtelling.
Since Pd(a∗)<1,w ed e ﬁ n eμd ∈  (A\{a∗}) by




Since truthtelling is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of Ud, we have that, for all i ∈ N,
ai ∈ Ai \{a∗








i a−i ω)μd(ai a−i)
whenever ω ∈{ ai}×A−i.A s d goes to 0, payoff functions ud(· ω) converge to g for
every ω ∈ A. Since μd ∈  (A \{ a∗}), which is compact, as d goes to 0, we can extract a
sequence of μd that converges to μ0 ∈  (A \{ a∗}). By continuity, we have that, for all
i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai \{a∗








i a−i)μ0(ai a−i)  (4)
We now use distribution μ0 to build a correlated equilibrium of G distinct from a∗.
For 0 ≤ q<1,deﬁneμ ∈  (A)by μ(a∗) = q andμ(a) = (1−q)μ0(a) foreverya ∈ A\{a∗}.
It follows from the family of inequalities (4)a n dt h ef a c tt h a ta∗ is a strict equilibrium of
G that, for q close enough to 1, μ is a correlated equilibrium of G. This contradicts the
premise that a∗ is the unique correlated equilibrium of G.  
We use ε-Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in the ex ante sense. That is, α∗ is an ε-








for all i ∈ N and all Qi-measurable strategies αi of player i.
Proof of Lemma 2.B yLemma 10, we know that there exists d>0 such that a∗ is
the unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of any (0 d)-elaboration of G.F i xs u c hd. As-
sume that there exists η>0 such that, for all ε>0,t h e r ee x i s t sa n(ε d)-elaboration
Uε = (N  ε Pε (Ai uiε Qiε)i∈N) of G such that any Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of Uε
induces probability less than 1−η on a∗. Pick any such equilibrium αε. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that there exists M>0 such that |uε| <Mfor all ε>0.L e t ˜ Uε
be the canonical normalization of Uε with respect to αε.B yLemma 9, truthtelling is a
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of ˜ Uε, ˜ Pε(a∗)<1 − η,a n d ˜ Uε is an (˜ ε  ˜ d)-elaboration of G,
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Consider the game ˆ Uε identical to ˜ Uε except that ˆ uiε(· ω)= gi whenever |˜ uiε(· ω)−
gi| > ˜ d. By an argument identical to KM (Lemma 3.4), truthtelling is a 2M˜ ε-Bayesian–
Nash equilibrium of ˆ Uε. Note that game ˆ Uε is a (0  ˜ d)-elaboration of G with state space
A.N o wt a k eε to 0. Because the set of incomplete-information games with state space
A and uniformly bounded payoff functions is compact, we can extract a convergent
sequence of (0  ˜ d)-elaborations ˆ Uε such that ˆ Pε(a∗)<1 − η. Denote by ˆ U0 the limit of
the sequence.
By continuity, ˆ U0 is a (0 d)-elaboration of G, truthtelling is a Bayesian–Nash equi-
librium of ˆ U0,a n d ˆ P0(a∗) ≤ 1 − η. This contradicts the premise that a∗ is the unique
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of all (0 d)-elaborations.  
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 is almost the same as that of Lemma 2. The only difference is to
replace Lemma 10 by the following.
Lemma 11 (Locally unique equilibrium for ﬁxed d). If a∗ is the iteratively d-dominant
equilibriumofG,thentheuniqueBayesian–Nashequilibriumofany(0 d/2)-elaboration
of G is to play a∗ with probability 1.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward and hence is omitted.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4
We deﬁne the following notion.
Definition 10 ((p d)-dominance). For d ≥ 0 and p = (p1     pn) ∈ (0 1]n,a na c t i o n
proﬁle a∗ is a (p d)-dominant equilibrium of G if, for all i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai \{ a∗
i },a n d









If a∗ is strictly p-dominant with
 
ipi < 1,t h e ni ti s(q d)-dominant for some q with  
iqi < 1 and some d>0. Lemma 4 follows from the following lemma.
Lemma12 (Strongrobustnessof (p d)-dominantequilibria). If a∗ is (p d)-dominantin
G with
 
ipi < 1,t h e ni ti sd/2-robust in G.
Proof. Since a∗ is (p d)-dominant, forall i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai\{a∗












whenever |g  −g|≤d/2.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 79
For any (ε d/2)-elaboration U = (N   P (Ai ui Qi)i∈N) of G,l e tu sd e ﬁ n e
 d/2 =
 
ω ∈   |∀ i ∈ N ∀ω  ∈ Qi(ω) |ui(· ω )−gi|≤d/2
 
 
By the deﬁnition of (ε d/2)-elaborations, we have that P( d/2) ≥ 1 − ε.A s i n K M , w e
are now interested in the set of states where event  d/2 is common p-belief, which we
denote by Cp( d/2). Proposition 4.2 (the critical path result) of KM implies that








ipi < 1,f o ra n yη>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 small enough such that, for any
(ε d/2)-elaboration U, P(Cp( d/2)) ≥ 1 − η.B y ( 5) and KM (Lemma 5.2), U has an
equilibrium α∗ such that α∗
i (ω)(a∗
i ) = 1 for all ω ∈ Cp( d/2). Equilibrium α∗ satisﬁes
Pα∗
(a∗) ≥ P(Cp( d/2)) ≥ 1−η, which concludes the proof.  
B.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Fix any t0 ≥ 1 and h0 ∈ Ht0−1.C o n s i d e r U ={ Ut} such that Ut = G for t  = t0 and
Ut0 = G  = (N (Ai g 
i)i∈N) such that, for every i ∈ N, g 
i(a) = gi(a)+d for a  = s∗(h0) and
g 
i(s∗(h0)) = gi(s∗(h0)) − d. Since every Ut is a (0 d)-elaboration of G,  U admits a PPE
arbitrarily close to s∗. By the closedness of the set of PPEs, s∗ is also a PPE of  U;h e n c e
s∗(h0) is a Nash equilibrium of G (ws∗ h0). Therefore, s∗(h0) is a 2d-strict equilibrium of
G(ws∗ h0).
B.8 Proof of Theorem 1
For an incomplete-information game U = (N   P (Ai ui Qi)i∈N) and w:Y → Rn,
let U(w) be the incomplete-information game with payoffs ui(a ω) + δE[wi(y)|a] for
every i ∈ N, a ∈ A,a n dω ∈  . Recall that, for a sequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of incomplete-
information games,  U denotes the inﬁnite-horizon game in which players play Ut in
period t. For a strategy proﬁle σ of  U and a history h ∈ H,l e twσ h be the continuation-
payoff proﬁle given by wσ h(y) = (vi(σ|(h y)))i∈N for each y ∈ Y. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is
aP P Eo f U if and only if σ∗(ht−1 ·) is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of Ut(wσ∗ ht−1) for
all ht−1 ∈ H.
For the “only if” part, suppose that s∗ is a d-robust PPE of  G for some d>0.B y
Lemma 5, s∗(h) is a 2d-strict equilibrium of G(ws∗ h) for every h ∈ H.
Pick any t0 ≥ 1 and h0 ∈ Ht0−1. We want to show that s∗(h0) is d-robust in G(ws∗ h0).
That is, for every η>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that every (ε d)-elaboration of G(ws∗ h0)
has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium that puts probability at least 1−η on s∗(h0).
Fix any η>0. Since s∗ is d-robust, there exists ε>0 such that, for every sequence
U ={ Ut} of (ε d)-elaborations of G with |U|≤2|g|/(1 − δ) + d,  U has a PPE that puts
probability at least 1−η on s∗(h) for every h ∈ H.F i xs u c hε. Pick any (ε d)-elaboration
U = G(ws∗ h0) of G(ws∗ h0). Without loss of generality, it is sufﬁcient to consider elabo-
rations such that |U|≤| g|/(1−δ)+d. Consider the “one-shot” sequence U ={ Ut} such80 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
that Ut = G for all t  = t0 and Ut0 = U −δws∗ h0.31 We have that |U|≤2|g|/(1−δ)+d.L e t
σ∗ be a PPE of  U that puts probability at least 1−η on s∗(h) for every h ∈ H. Note that
σ∗(h) is a Nash equilibrium of G(wσ∗ h) for every h ∈ Ht−1 with t  = t0 and that σ∗(h0 ·)
is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of U(wσ∗ h0).
Without loss of generality, we can assume η to be small enough so that the following
statements hold.
• For every t1 >t 0, h1 ∈ Ht1−1,a n dU ={ Ut} with |U| <M  and Ut = G for all t  = t0,
if a strategy proﬁle σ of  U puts probability at least 1−η on s∗(h) for every h ∈ H,
then |wσ h1 −ws∗ h1|≤d.
• If a∗ is a 2(1−δ)d-strict equilibrium of some G  = (N (Ai g 
i)i∈N),t h e nG  has no
other Nash equilibria in the η-neighborhood of a∗.
W en o ws h o wt h a tσ∗(h) = s∗(h) for every t>t 0 and h ∈ Ht−1.32 By the choice of η,
we have |wσ∗ h −ws∗ h|≤d. Then, since s∗(h) is 2d-strict in G(ws∗ h), s∗(h) is 2(1 −δ)d-
strict in G(wσ∗ h). Since G(wσ∗ h) has no other Nash equilibria in the η-neighborhood
of s∗(h),t h e nσ∗(h) = s∗(h).
Therefore, we have wσ∗ h0 = ws∗ h0 and hence σ∗(h0 ·) is a Bayesian–Nash equilib-
rium of U (wσ∗ h0) = U (ws∗ h0) = U that puts probability at least 1−η on s∗(h0).
For the “if” part, suppose that there exists d>0 such that, for every h ∈ H, s∗(h) is a
d-robust PPE of G(ws∗ h).F i xa n yd  with 0 <d   <( 1 − δ)d. We will show that, for every
η>0 and M>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that, for every sequence U ={ Ut} of (ε d )-
elaborations of G with |U| <M,  U has a PPE σ∗ that puts probability at least 1 − η on
s∗(h) for every h ∈ H.
Fix any M>0.P i c k¯ ε>0 and ¯ η>0 such that, for every t ≥ 1, h ∈ Ht−1,a n dU ={ Ut}
of (ε d )-elaborations of G with |U| <M,i fs t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l eσ of  U puts probability at
least 1 −¯ η on s∗(h ) for all h  ∈ Ht −1 with t  >t,t h e n|wσ h − ws∗ h|≤d /(1 − δ).P i c k
d   > 0 such that d /(1 − δ) + δd   <d .F i x a n y η>0. We can assume without loss of
generality that η< ¯ η.
For each a ∈ A, since the set of continuation-payoff proﬁles ws∗ h for all h ∈ H is a
bounded subset of Rn|A|, there exists a ﬁnite set of histories, H(a),s u c ht h a ts∗(h) = a
for every h ∈ H(a)and, whenever s∗(h ) = a,t h e n|ws∗ h  −ws∗ h|≤d   for some h ∈ H(a).
For each a ∈ A and h ∈ H(a), since a is d-robust in G(ws∗ h),t h e r ee x i s t sεh > 0 such
that every (εh d)-elaboration of G(ws∗ h) has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium that puts
probability at least 1 − η on a.L e tε = min(¯ ε mina∈Aminh∈H(a)εh)>0.T h e n ,f o re v e r y
h ∈ H,e v e r y(ε d )-elaboration of G(ws∗ h) has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium that puts
probability at least 1−η on s∗(h). Note that ε is chosen uniformly in h ∈ H.
Fix any sequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of (ε d /(1−δ))-elaborations of G with |U| <M.N o w
we construct a PPE σ∗ of  U as follows.
For each T<∞, consider the “truncated” sequence UT ={ UT
t }t∈N of elaborations
such that UT
t = Ut for t ≤ T and UT
t = G for all t>T. We backwardly construct a PPE σT
of  UT as follows.
31The notation U −δws∗ h0 denotes the incomplete-information game with payoffs u(· ω)−δws∗ h0.
32Since Ut is a complete-information game G for t  = t0, we suppress ωt from the notation σ∗(h ωt).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 81
• For h ∈ Ht−1 with t>T,l e tσT(h) = s∗(h).
• For h ∈ Ht−1 with t ≤ T,l e tσT(h ·) be a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of Ut(wσT h)
that puts probability at least 1 − η on s∗(h). Such a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium
exists because σT(h  ·) puts probability at least 1 − η on s∗(h ) for all h  ∈ Ht −1
with t  >tand thus |wσT h − ws∗ h|≤d /(1 − δ). Therefore, Ut(wσT h) is an
(ε d /(1−δ))-elaboration of G(ws∗ h).
Since the set of all public-strategy proﬁles is a compact metric space in the prod-
uct topology, let σ∗ be the limit of {σT}T∈N (take a subsequence if necessary). That is,
σT(h ωt) → σ∗(h ωt) as T →∞pointwise for all t ≥ 1, h ∈ Ht−1,a n dωt ∈  t.B yt h e
upperhemicontinuity ofPPEswith respecttopayoffperturbations, σ∗ is aPPEof  U.B y
the construction of σ∗, σ∗(h ·) puts probability at least 1−η on s∗(h) for every h ∈ H.
B.9 Proof of Lemma 6
(i) holds by the deﬁnition of Bd. (ii) and (iii) follow from Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem.
B.10 Proof of Corollary 2
We ﬁrst show that V rob =
 
d>0V d.F o re a c hv ∈ V rob,l e ts∗ be a strongly robust PPE of
 G that yields value v.T h e n ,b yTheorem 1,t h e r ee x i s t sd>0 such that V ∗ ={ v(s∗|h) ∈
Rn | h ∈ H} is self-generating with respect to Bd.B yLemma 6, v ∈ V ∗ ⊆ V d.T h u sV rob ⊆  
d>0V d. Let us turn to the other direction of set inclusion.
For each d>0, since V d is self-generating with respect to Bd,f o re a c hv ∈ V d,t h e r e
exist a(v) ∈ A and w(v ·):Y → V d such that w(v ·) enforces (a(v) v) d-robustly. Pick
any v ∈ V d.W e c o n s t r u c t s∗ recursively as follows: s∗(∅) = a(v), s∗(y1) = a(w(v y1)),
s∗(y1 y2) = a(w(w(v y1) y2)), and so on. By construction, s∗(h) is d-robust in G(ws∗ h)
for every h ∈ H. Therefore, by Theorem 1, s∗ is a strongly robust PPE of  G that attains
v,a n dt h u sv ∈ V rob.T h u sV d ⊆ V rob for every d>0.






k=0(Bd)k(F), which corresponds to APS’s
algorithm result. To this end, we deﬁne ¯ Bd(F) by the closure of Bd(F). Denote f∞(F) =  ∞
k=0fk(F) for f = Bd or ¯ Bd. By the monotonicity of Bd and ¯ Bd (Lemma 6), we have
V d ⊆ (Bd)∞(F) ⊆ ( ¯ Bd)∞(F) for every d>0.
To prove the opposite direction of set inclusion, we show that, for each d>0,
( ¯ Bd)∞(F) is self-generating with respect to Bd/2, which implies that ( ¯ Bd)∞(F) ⊆ V d/2
by Lemma 6. Pick any v ∈ ( ¯ Bd)∞(F).F o r e a c h k ≥ 1, since we have v ∈ ( ¯ Bd)∞(F) ⊆
( ¯ Bd)k(F),t h e r ee x i s tak ∈ A and wk:Y → ( ¯ Bd)k−1(F) such that wk enforces (ak v)d-
robustly. Since A and Y are ﬁnite, and ( ¯ Bd)k(F) is compact, by taking a subsequence,
we can assume without loss of generality that ak = a∗ and wk → w∗ as k →∞for some
a∗ ∈ A and w∗:Y → Rn. This implies that there exists k∗ ≥ 1 such that |wk∗
− w∗|≤
d/(2δ). Since wk∗
enforces (a∗ v) d-robustly, w∗ enforces (a∗ v) d/2-robustly. More-
over, for each k ≥ 1 and y ∈ Y, since wl(y) ∈ ( ¯ Bd)l−1(F) ⊆ ( ¯ Bd)k−1(F) for every l ≥ k
and ( ¯ Bd)k−1(F) is compact, by taking l →∞ ,w eh a v ew∗(y) ∈ ( ¯ Bd)k−1(F). Since this
holds for every k ≥ 1, it follows that w∗(y) ∈ ( ¯ Bd)∞(F).T h u s v ∈ Bd/2(( ¯ Bd)∞(F)),a n d
( ¯ Bd)∞(F) is self-generating with respect to Bd/2.82 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
B.11 Stahl’s characterization
Here we summarize the results of Stahl (1991), which characterize V SPE,t h es e to fS P E























V0 thesetoffeasibleandindividuallyrationalvaluesofG,V0 = (1/(1−δ))co{(0 0) 
(1 1) (0 p) (p 0)}
VQ the set of values deﬁned by VQ = (1/(1−δ))co{(0 0) (1 1) (0 q) (q 0)}
VT the set of values deﬁned by VT = (1/(1−δ))co{(0 0) (0 b−c) (b−c 0)}
VD the set of values deﬁned by VD = (1/(1−δ))co{(0 0) (1 1)}.
Lemma 13(Stahl 1991). The set V SPE is characterized as follows.
(i) If δ ≥ max{(b−1)/b c/(c +1)},t h e nV SPE = V0.
(ii) If b − 1 ≤ c ≤ h and δ ∈[ (b − 1)/b c/(c + 1)) or c>hand δ ∈[ δ∗ c/(c+ 1)),t h e n
V SPE = VQ.
(iii) If c<b−1 and δ ∈[ c/b (b−1)/b),t h e nV SPE = VT.
(iv) If c>hand δ ∈[ (b−1)/b δ∗),t h e nV SPE = VD.
(v) If δ<min{c/b (b−1)/b},t h e nV SPE ={ (0 0)}.
B.12 Proof of Lemma 7
The SPE Pareto frontier is the set of v ∈ V SPE such that there is no v  ∈ V SPE that Pareto-
dominates v. We say that an SPE is Pareto-efﬁcient if it induces a payoff proﬁle on the
SPE Pareto frontier. We begin with the following lemma. We say that V ⊆ Rn is self-
generating with respect to coB if V ⊆ coB(V ).( R e c a l lt h a tB(V ) is the set of all payoff
proﬁles that are (not necessarily robustly) generated by V .)
Lemma 14 (SPE Pareto frontier of games in GDC/CC). Let PD ∈ GDC/CC.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 83
(i) The SPE Pareto frontier is self-generating with respect to coB.
(ii) No Pareto-efﬁcient SPE prescribes outcome DD on the equilibrium path.
(iii) The SPE Pareto frontier can be sustained by SPEs that prescribe outcome CC per-
manently along the equilibrium play once it is prescribed and that never prescribe
outcome DD on or off the equilibrium path.
Proof. From Stahl’s characterization, we know that the set of SPE payoff proﬁles of  PD
takestheformV SPE = co{(0 0) (1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ)) (0 φ) (φ 0)},w h e r eφ ≥ 1/(1−δ).
We begin with point (i). Pick a Pareto-efﬁcient SPE s∗. Note that continuation-payoff
proﬁles of s∗ on the equilibrium path are always on the SPE Pareto frontier (otherwise,
replacingthecontinuation strategiesbyaPareto-dominatingSPEwouldimprove on s∗).
In what follows, we modify s∗ so that continuation values are on the SPE Pareto frontier
even off the equilibrium path. This is possible because points (0 φ)and (φ 0) belong
totheSPEParetofrontier. Considerstrategyproﬁle ˆ s∗ thatcoincideswith s∗ ontheequi-
librium path, but such that, whenever player 1 deviates, continuation values are (0 φ),
andwhenever player 2 deviates alone, continuation valuesare (φ 0). Since 0 is themin-
imax value for both players, the fact that s∗ is an SPE implies that ˆ s∗ is also an SPE. This
shows that the SPE Pareto frontier is self-generating with respect to coB.
Let us turn to point (ii). Consider a Pareto-efﬁcient SPE s∗. If there is an equilibrium
history h at which DD is taken, then the strategy proﬁle ˆ s∗ obtained by skipping the
history and instead playing as if the next period had already been reached is also an SPE
and Pareto-dominates s∗. Hence, action DD is never used on the equilibrium path.33
We now proceed with point (iii). From point (i), we know that the SPE Pareto fron-
tier is self-generating with respect to coB. Since we have public randomization, this
implies that the SPE Pareto frontier can be generated by SPEs whose continuation pay-
off proﬁles are always extreme points of the convex hull of the SPE Pareto frontier.
This is the bang-bang property of APS. There are three such points, (0 φ), (φ 0),a n d
(1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ)).B e c a u s e(1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ)) is not the discounted sum of payoffs
upon action proﬁles other than CC, this implies that, in any SPE that sustains values
(1/(1 − δ) 1/(1 − δ)),o u t c o m eCC is played permanently on the equilibrium path. In-
versely, when values (0 φ) are delivered, the current action proﬁle is CD (otherwise,
player 1 would get strictly positive value), and when values (φ 0) are delivered, the cur-
rent action proﬁle is DC. These imply that Pareto-efﬁcient SPEs that take a bang-bang
form are such that, once CC is prescribed, it is prescribed forever along the equilibrium
play. Also, by point (ii), such SPEs never prescribe DD on or off the equilibrium path.  
Proof of Lemma 7. Let us consider PD ∈ intGDC/CC. Since, for every PD  sufﬁciently
closetoPD, CCisenforcedbyanSPEof PD  withcontinuation-payoffproﬁle(1 1)after
CC,w eh a v e1 >( 1−δ)b.
33If players only play DD following h, one can simply replace the entire continuation equilibrium by
some SPE that gives the players strictly positive value.84 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
For any d ∈ (0 1), let us denote by PDd the game
CD
C 1 1 −c b
D b −cd   d
By subtracting d from all payoffs and dividing them by 1−d,w eo b t a i nP D  
d with payoffs
CD
C 1 1 −c−d





which is strategically equivalent to PDd. Since PD ∈ intGDC/CC,t h e r ee x i s t s ¯ d ∈ (0 1)
such that, for d ∈ (0  ¯ d),w eh a v et h a tP D  
d ∈ GDC/CC. This means that the set of SPE pay-
off proﬁles of  PD 
d is a quadrangle co{(0 0) (1/(1−δ) 1/(1−δ)) (0 φ ) (φ  0)},w h e r e
φ  ≥ 1/(1 − δ). Note that, since DC is enforceable under complete information in  PD 
d,
we have (−c −d)/(1−d)+δφ  ≥ 0.B yLemma 14, we know that the SPE Pareto frontier
of  PD 
d is sustained by a class of SPEs such that continuation payoffs are always on the
SPE Pareto frontier, once action proﬁle CC is prescribed, it is prescribed forever along
theequilibriumplay, and actionproﬁle DD is never prescribedon orofftheequilibrium
path. Let us denote by E this class of strategy proﬁles.
Since game PD 
d is strategically equivalent to game PDd, strategy proﬁles in E are
also SPEs of  PDd and generate its SPE Pareto frontier. The SPE Pareto frontier of  PDd
is obtained by multiplying equilibrium values of  PD 
d by 1 − d and adding d/(1 − δ).
We denote by  d this frontier:  d is the piecewise line that connects (d/(1 − δ) φ),
(1/(1 − δ) 1/(1 − δ)),a n d(φ d/(1 − δ)),w h e r eφ = (1 − d)φ  + d/(1 − δ) ≥ c/δ +
d/[δ(1 − δ)]. Note that in  PDd, continuation payoffs of these SPEs are at least d/(1 − δ)
at all histories.
Let us now show that strategy proﬁles in E are also SPEs of  PD. This occurs because
PD differs from PDd only in that the payoff proﬁle from DD is (0 0) rather than (d d).
Since strategy proﬁles in E never use outcome DD and d>0, whenever the one-shot
incentive compatibility holds in  PDd, it also holds in  PD. Hence strategy proﬁles in E
are SPEs of  PD. Since payoff proﬁles upon CD, DC,a n dCC are the same in PD and
PDd, E generates  d in  PD, and continuation-payoff proﬁles of E in  PD are always in
 d.(  d may not be the SPE Pareto frontier of  PD.)
We now reach the ﬁnal step of the proof. First, permanent defection is strongly
robust, and thus (0 0) ∈ V rob. Pick any s∗ ∈ E that attains v ∈  d.L e t u s s h o w t h a t
there exists ˆ s∗ such that it attains v and ˆ s∗(h) is iteratively d-dominant in PD(wˆ s∗ h) for
d ∈ (0 min{ ¯ d b− 1 c 1 − (1 − δ)b}). For each history h, we modify continuation strate-
gies as follows.
• If s∗(h) = CD, then replace off-path continuation-payoff proﬁles by w(CC) =
w(DC)= w(DD) = (0 0),w h e r e(0 0) is generated by permanent defection. SinceTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 85
s∗ ∈ E,wehavethatthevaluefromplaying CDathisatleast d. ThisyieldsthatCD
is iteratively d-dominant in PD(wˆ s∗ h).I fs∗(h) = DC, a symmetric change makes
DC iteratively d-dominant in a game PD(wˆ s∗ h), where off-path continuation-
payoff proﬁles are set to (0 0) while on-path continuation-payoff proﬁles are not
changed.
• If s∗(h) = CC, then replace off-path continuation-payoff proﬁles by w(DD) =
(0 0), w(DC) = (d/(1 − δ) φ),a n dw(CD) = (φ d/(1 − δ)). Since s∗ ∈ E,t h e
on-path continuation-payoff proﬁle is (1/(1 − δ) 1/(1 − δ)). Since 1/(1 − δ) >
b+(δ/(1−δ))d +d and −c +δφ ≥ d, CC is iteratively d-dominant in PD(wˆ s∗ h).



























is sustained by some SPE that prescribes the iteratively d-dominant equilibrium of the
corresponding augmented stage game at every history. By taking d to 0, we obtain
that, for every v ∈{ (0 0) (1/(1 − δ) 1/(1 − δ))}∪intV SPE,t h e r ee x i s td>0 and an SPE
with payoff proﬁle v that prescribes the iteratively d-dominant equilibrium of the cor-
responding augmented stage game at every history. This concludes the proof when
PD ∈ intGDC/CC. A similar proof holds when PD ∈ intGDC.  
B.13 Proof of Theorem 2
Let   ={ λ ∈ Rn || λ|=1} be the set of n-dimensional unit vectors. For each λ ∈   and
k ∈ R,l e tH(λ k)={ v ∈ Rn | λ·v ≤ k}. Following Fudenberg and Levine (1994), for each
λ ∈   andδ<1,w edeﬁnethemaximalscore k(λ δ)bythesupremumof λ·v suchthatv
is d-robustly generated by H(λ λ· v) under discount factor δ with some d>0.( I ft h e r e
is no such v,l e tk(λ δ) =− ∞ .) As in Lemma 3.1(i) of Fudenberg and Levine (1994),
k(λ δ) is independent of δ, thus is denoted k(λ).L e tQ =
 
λ∈ H(λ k(λ)).T h es e tQ
characterizes the limit of strongly robust PPE payoff proﬁles as δ → 1.
Lemma 15 (Limit of strongly robust PPE payoff proﬁles). We have
(i) NV rob(δ) ⊆ Q for every δ<1 and
(ii) if dimQ = n, then, for any compact subset K of intQ, there exists δ < 1 such that
K ⊆ NV rob(δ) for every δ>δ.
We omit the proof, for it only replaces the one-shot deviation principle in the proof
of Theorem 3.1 of Fudenberg and Levine (1994)b yTheorem 1.
Let ei be the n-dimensional coordinate vector whose ith component is 1 and other
components are 0.
Lemma 16 (Characterization of k(λ)). Suppose that (Y π) has strong full rank. Then
(i) k(λ) = maxa∈Aλ·g(a) for any λ ∈  \{−e1     −en}86 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(ii) k(−ei) =−mina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai gi(a)
(iii) Q = NV ∗.
Proof.F i x δ. For(i), ﬁrstconsiderthecasethat λ hasatleasttwononzerocomponents.
Pick any a0 ∈ A.L e t Y ={ y1     yL} with L =| Y|.A r r a n g e A ={ a0 a1     aK} in a
“lexicographic” order that puts a0
i >a i for ai  = a0
i, i.e., 1 = kn < ···<k 1 <k 0 = K + 1
such that ki =| Ai+1 ×···×An| and i = min{j ∈ N | ak
j  = a0
j} for every k with ki ≤ k<









has full row rank for every i  = j.












for every i ∈ N and k with ki ≤ k<k i−1,a n dλ·w(y)= λ·g(a0) for each y ∈ Y. Note that
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has full row rank. Thus the system of equations has a solution w.
Now note that a0
1 is strictly dominant for player 1 in G(w). More generally, a0
i is
strictly dominant for player i in G(w) if players 1     i−1 follow a0
1     a0
i−1.T h u sa0 is
iteratively d-dominant in G(w).B yLemma 3, a0 is strongly robust in G(w);t h u sk(λ) ≥
λ · g(a0). Since this holds for any a0 ∈ A,w eh a v ek(λ) ≥ maxa∈Aλ · g(a). The other
direction of the inequality is obvious.
Second, suppose that λ is a coordinate vector. Without loss of generality, we assume
λ = en.L e t a0 ∈ argmaxa∈Agn(a).A r r a n g e A ={ a0     aK} as in the ﬁrst case. Since
(Y π) has strong full rank,  i(a0) has full row rank for every i ∈ N.T h u s ,f o re v e r yd>0,
























for every k with 1 ≤ k<k n−1,a n dgn(a0) − κd ≤ wn(y) ≤ gn(a0). As argued in the
previous case, a0 is iteratively d-dominant in G(w).B y Lemma 3, a0 is d/2-robust in
G(w).A l s o a0 sustains v = (1 − δ)g(a0) + δE[w(y)|a0] such that vn ≥ gn(a0) − κd and
wn(y) ≤ gn(a0)foreveryy ∈ Y.L e tv  = v−κdδ/(1−δ)en andw (y) = w(y)−κd/(1−δ)en
for every y ∈ Y.T h e nw  enforces (a0 v )d / 2-robustly, w 
n(y) ≤ v 
n for every y ∈ Y,a n d
v 
n ≥ gn(a0) − κd/(1 − δ). Since d>0 is arbitrary, we have k(en) ≥ gn(a0). The other
direction of the inequality is obvious.
The proof of (ii) is similar to the proof of the second case of (i). The only difference
is to use a minimax action proﬁle for each player.
Part (iii) follows from (i) and (ii).  
Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas 15 and 16.
B.14 Proof of Proposition 5
Supposethat γ := sup{v1−v2 | (v1 v2) ∈ NV rob(δ)} > 1
2 forsome δ<1.F o ra n yε ∈ (0 γ),
there exists (v1 v2) ∈ V rob(δ) such that (1 − δ)(v1 − v2)>γ− ε and action proﬁle RL is
taken at the initial history.34 By Theorem 1,t h e r ee x i s tw(yL) w(yR) w(yM) ∈ V rob(δ)
that enforce (RL (v1 v2)) robustly, i.e., such that RL is strongly robust in
G(w) =
LR
L 3+δw1(yL) 3+δw2(yL)δ w 1(yM) 1+δw2(yM)
R v1 v2 δw1(yR) δw2(yR)
 
34If this is not the case, delete several initial periods. This always increases v1 −v2 since g1(a) ≤ g2(a) for
all a  = RL.88 Chassang and Takahashi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
where




Let γ(y)= (1−δ)(w1(y)−w2(y)) for each y ∈ Y. By the deﬁnition of γ,w eh a v eγ(y)≤ γ
for every y ∈ Y.
Since RL is a strict equilibrium of G(w),
1
3δ(w2(yL)+w2(yR)+w2(yM)) > δw2(yR) (6)
1+ 1
3δ(w1(yL)+w1(yR)+w1(yM)) > 3+δw1(yL)  (7)
Also, since LR is not strictly (1/2 1/2)-dominant (KM, Lemma 5.5), either
3+δw1(yL)+δw1(yM) ≤ 1+ 1
3δ(w1(yL)+w1(yR)+w1(yM))+δw1(yR) (8)
or
1+δw2(yM)+δw2(yR) ≤ 3+δw2(yL)+ 1
3δ(w2(yL)+w2(yR)+w2(yM))  (9)
If (8) holds, then (6)a n d( 8)y i e l d3(1−δ)/δ < −γ(yL)+2γ(yR)−γ(yM).H e n c e ,














thus γ<ε / ( 1−δ). Since ε can be arbitrarily small, this contradicts with γ>1
2.
Similarly, if (9) holds, then (7)a n d( 9)y i e l d3(1 − δ)/δ < −2γ(yL) + γ(yR) + γ(yM).
Hence,


























2 +ε/(1−δ). Since ε can be arbitrarily small, this contradicts γ>1
2.
B.15 Proof of Lemma 8
Fix η>0 and M>0. Since a∗ is d-robust, there exists ε0 > 0 such that every
(ε d)-elaboration of G has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium that puts probability at
least 1 − η on a∗.L e t ε = min(ε (d − d )/M) > 0.F i x a n (ε d )-elaboration U =
(N   P (Ai ui Qi)i∈N) of G with |u| <Mand priors (Pi)i∈N with m(P Pi) ≤ ε.C o n -
sider an incomplete-information game U  = (N   P (Ai u 
i Qi)i∈N) with common
prior P,w h e r ee a c hu 
i is deﬁned by u 
i(· ω)= (Pi(ω)/P(ω))ui(· ω)if P(ω)>0 and by
u 
i(· ω)= 0 otherwise. Since |u 
i(· ω)− ui(· ω)|≤m(P Pi)|u| <d− d  P-almost surely,Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Robustness to incomplete information 89
U  is an (ε d)-elaboration of G, hence has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium α∗ that puts
probability at least 1 − η on a∗. By the construction of U , α∗ is also a Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium of the noncommon prior game (U (Pi)i∈N).
B.16 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 1.
B.17 Proof of Proposition 7
We show that strong robustness in the sense of Deﬁnition 8 is also characterized by the
one-shot robustness principle, i.e., if there exists d>0 such that s∗(h) is d-robust in
G(ws∗ h),t h e ns∗ is strongly robust in Deﬁnition 8. The proof is similar to that of Theo-
rem 1. For each sequence ˆ U of correlated (ε d)-elaborations of G,w ec o n s t r u c taP P E
ˆ σT of truncated game   ˆ UT close to s∗ along normal regimes and take T →∞ .F o re a c h
sequence ht−1 of public signals, players’ private information is summarized by the cur-
rentpublicregime zt.T h u s ,i fzt ∈ Z∗
t ,thenthecontinuationgameisclosetoG(ws∗ ht−1);
thus it has a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium ˆ σT(ht−1 zt ·) that puts high probability on
s∗(ht−1).I f zt / ∈ Z∗
t , then players’ actions outside normal regimes are determined ar-
bitrarily by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem.
Appendix C: Public randomization
Here we extend our framework to allow for public randomization. Given a complete-
information game G, we denote by ˜  G the repeated game of stage game G with public
randomization, in which, at the beginning of each period t, players observe a common
signal θt distributed uniformly on [0 1) and independently of the past history. We write
θt = (θ1     θt) ∈[ 0 1)t, ˜ ht−1 = (ht−1 θt) ∈ ˜ Ht−1 = Ht−1 ×[ 0 1)t,a n d ˜ H =
 
t≥1 ˜ Ht−1.
Ap u r es t r a t e g yo fp l a y e ri is a mapping si: ˜ H → Ai such that there exists a sequence
{Rt} of partitions consisting of ﬁnitely many subintervals of [0 1) such that ˜ si(ht−1 ·)
is R1 ⊗···⊗Rt-measurable on [0 1)t for every ht−1 ∈ H. Conditional on public his-
tory (ht−1 θt−1), a strategy proﬁle ˜ s induces a probability distribution over sequences of
future action proﬁles, which induces continuation payoffs








Let w˜ s ˜ h be the continuation-payoff proﬁle given by w˜ s ˜ h(y) = (vi(˜ s|(˜ h y)))i∈N for each
y ∈ Y. A strategy proﬁle ˜ s∗ is a PPE if vi(˜ s∗|(ht−1 θt−1)) ≥ vi(˜ si  ˜ s∗
−i|(ht−1 θt−1)) for every
ht−1 ∈ H, θt−1 ∈[ 0 1)t−1, i ∈ N,a n d˜ si.
Given a sequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of incomplete-information games, we consider the
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is a public strategy of player i if there exists a sequence {Rt} of partitions consist-
ing of ﬁnitely many subintervals of [0 1) such that ˜ σi(˜ ht−1 ·) is Qit-measurable on  t
for every ˜ ht−1 ∈ ˜ H,a n d˜ σi(ht−1 · ωt) is R1 ⊗···⊗Rt-measurable on [0 1)t for every
ht−1 ∈ H and ωt ∈  t. A public-strategy proﬁle ˜ σ∗ is a PPE if vi(˜ σ∗|(ht−1 θt−1)) ≥
vi(˜ σi  ˜ σ∗
−i|(ht−1 θt−1)) for every ht−1 ∈ H, θt−1 ∈[ 0 1)t−1, i ∈ N, and public strategy ˜ σi
of player i.
We deﬁne d-robustness in repeated games with public randomization as follows.
Definition 11 (Dynamic robustness with public randomization). For d ≥ 0,aP P E˜ s∗
of ˜  G is d-robust if, for every η>0 and M>0,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that, for every
sequence U ={ Ut}t∈N of (ε d)-elaborations of G with |U| <M,g a m e˜  U has a PPE ˜ σ∗
such that P
˜ σ∗(˜ ht−1 ·)
t (˜ s∗(˜ ht−1)) ≥ 1−η for every t ≥ 1 and ˜ ht−1 ∈ ˜ Ht−1.
AP P Es∗ is strongly robust if it is d-robust for some d>0.
Let ˜ V rob denote the set of all payoff proﬁles of strongly robust PPEs in ˜  G.
The following proposition is the one-shot robustness principle for repeated games
with public randomization.
Proposition 8 (One-shot robustness principle with public randomization). A strategy
proﬁle ˜ s∗ is a strongly robust PPE of ˜  G if and only if there exists d>0 such that, for every
˜ h ∈ ˜ H, ˜ s∗(˜ h) is a d-robust equilibrium of G(w˜ s∗ ˜ h).
Proof. The proof of the “only if” part is essentially the same as that of Theorem 1,a n d
thus is omitted.
The proof of the “if” part is very similar to that of Theorem 1. One difference is
in the last step, where we construct a sequence of PPEs ˜ σT of “truncated” games ˜  UT
and then take the limit of these PPEs to obtain a PPE of the original game ˜  U.H e r e ,
because ˜ s∗ is adapted to some sequence {Rt} of partitions consisting of ﬁnitely many
subintervals of [0 1),w ec a nc o n s t r u c taP P E˜ σT of ˜  UT truncated at period T such that
˜ σT(ht−1 · ωt) is R1 ⊗···⊗Rt-measurable for every ht−1 ∈ H and ωt ∈  t. Since the set
of all {Rt}-adapted public-strategy proﬁles is a compact metrizable space in the prod-
uct topology, there exists ˜ σ∗ such that ˜ σT(ht−1 θt ωt) →˜ σ∗(ht−1 θt ωt) pointwise as
T →∞for every ht−1 ∈ H, θt ∈[ 0 1)t,a n dωt ∈  t, and uniformly in θt on each cell of
R1 ⊗···⊗Rt (take a subsequence if necessary). Then σ∗ is a PPE of ˜  U.  
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